Climate Change in Europe: On the Culpability of the Media

A report by the E.U. Copernicus Climate-Change Service in 2024 contains the finding that “Europe is the continent with the fastest-rising temperatures on Earth, having warmed twice as fast as the global average since the 1980s.”[1] In spite of “fastest-rising” and “twice as fast” are alarming expressions, no such corresponding sense of urgency had translated into a political will capable of pushing through game-changing legislation and regulations in the European Union. The short-term financial interests of industry, cost-conscious consumers, workers not wanting to be laid off, and taxpayers would pale in comparison were a sense of emergency to take hold the domain of politics. “Weak” states (i.e., governments) that are not willing or even able to resist short-term political pressures from an electorate exacerbate the problem even in the midst of climate change, which scientists decades earlier had predicted would really begin to move the needle on air-temperatures globally in the 2020s (and just wait until the oceans become saturated with CO₂!). You ain’t seen nothin yet may be the mantra for the 2030s.

It seems to be a case of the proverbial oblivious frog in gradually yet steadily warming water in a cooking pan on a stove, as the editors at journalistic media companies have been orienting their news to reporting on specific climate-related events that are disasters only in particular locales and thus do not point explicitly to global warming. For instance, on 4 July, 2025, a wildfire in the E.U. state of Greece “prompted evacuations in coastal areas south of Athens” and mobilized “75 firefighters, including five elite ground teams . . . alongside fire engines, volunteers, four helicopters, and two aircraft” as well as municipal water trucks.[2] “(O)ngoing heatwaves, drought and strong winds” kept the fire-risk high in the area.[3] Only at the end of Euronews’ article on the fire is climate change mentioned, and then only as an attenuating factor: “While fires are common in the area, experts say climate change is exacerbating them.”[4] That is to say: Oh, by the way, the warming of the planet’s atmosphere and oceans is in play here. Even as climate change is relegated thusly, that it is only exacerbating wildfires in the southern states such as Greece is a way of deflating claims that climate change ought to be handled as an emergency in terms of public policy. The media has thus been culpable.  

1. David O’Sullivan, “Firefighters Battle Wildfires in Greece and Turkey, Prompting Evacuations and Emergency Response,” Euronews.com, July 4, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Time Magazine’s Person of the Year: Taylor Swift

Time magazine named the singer Taylor Swift as its person of the year for 2023. Such a force of nature were her stadium-filled concerts during that summer that they triggered economic booms in the respective host cities. In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for example, hotel rooms went for as much as $2,500 downtown on the night of the concert. In terms of American culture, the analogy of gravity waves may fit. During an interview for television at her home (or one of her homes), Swift’s savvy business acumen was very evident; her marketing prowess was extraordinary. She even re-released her own songs, resulting in a huge financial windfall for what are really the same songs merely re-sung. It is not as if she had grown a new voice. Swift personifies American culture, whose “movers and shakers” seem “happy go lucky” on stage yet, behind the scenes, they tend to be lazar-focused on the business end. In short, considerable distance may exist between the societal image and the private business practitioner, and the ethical element can get lost in the shuffle and excitement.

To be sure, economics was evident in the “Swiftie” phenomenon during the summer of 2023. According to Time, Swift “achieved a kind of nuclear fusion: shooting art and commerce together to release an energy of historic force.”[1] Her Eras concert tour "brought in a whopping $1.04 billion with 4.35 million tickets sold across 60 tour dates."[2] Not just any singer can make such a haul and even trigger municipal economic booms and saturate the media’s attention worldwide simply by going on tour. Also, the magazine is clear that such a gargantuan amount of money brought in is not “something we often chalk up to the alignments of planets and fates,” for “giving too much credit to the stars ignores [Swift’s] skill and her power.”[3] In particular, her intense and sustained focus on every conceivable way, such as by re-recording existing songs and bundling them (admittedly with some songs from her vault) into albums in their own right, attending to merchandise and actively using the media for free publicity, to increase revenue leveraged, or made use of, her tremendous market power that was unrivaled; she dominated the airwaves during the summer of 2023. The “Taylor’s Version” albums provide us with an interesting case study wherein hype, money, and ethics are all in the mix.

According to Time, “Swift began releasing re-recordings of her back catalog in 2021 in an effort to reclaim her original music, after her initial label Big Machine Records sold her masters to Scooter Braun’s Ithaca Holdings in 2019. ‘Now Scooter has stripped me of my life’s work, that I wasn’t given an opportunity to buy,’ Swift wrote. . . . ‘Essentially, my musical legacy is about to lie in the hands of someone who tried to dismantle it.’”[4] I don’t doubt the authenticity of her emotive motivation here. In the vernacular, she was pissed.  Even so, if she had signed a contract with Big Machine Records giving it the unilateral right to sell the masters of her songs, and the purchaser has the legal right of use, then she had no legal or ethical claim to preempt the sale or be sold the masters outright. Of course, if labels write heavily unfair contracts essentially reflecting the commercial interests of the labels, taking advantage of the lack of bargaining power of new signers, ethical critique is fair game.

By its very nature, a contract is a coming together of (at least) two interests, with consideration (money) given by one party to the other. A residential lease, for instance, should reflect both interests. It should not restrict use of premises to be narrowed down to reflect only how the property owner would use the space or would like the space to be used. A property owner might prefer a “no guest” policy, but such as “policy”—the very word being presumptuous—violates reasonable use of premises. Furthermore, the property owner’s personal religious or moral lifestyle, for instance, should not bind the counterparty as long as the property itself is not damaged. “I don’t believe in eating meat, so you are not allowed to use the kitchen of your apartment to cook meat,” for instance, is presumptuous and dogmatic. More to the point, such a clause would violate or nullify the fact that in receiving rent, the property owner is selling the use of the space (as long as the property is not damaged). The mantra, “It’s my house,” taken as an absolute, is circumscribed when use is being sold for consideration (i.e., rent). Having it both ways is selfish and childish.

Whether or not Taylor Swift originally signed a one-sided contract is beyond my ability to investigate, given the information that I have. Her fans did not know either, and so, because of her emotional claim and her “star power,” her ethical cause resonated. Even so, it can be asked whether it is ethical to have hyped “Taylor’s Version” albums to the extent that buyers were willing to pay the full price of an album even if they had most of the songs already. To be sure, the “Taylor’s Versions” included “vault tracks”—songs not on the original albums. She also updated some lyrics. Even so, it can be asked whether the additional work justifies a full price of a new album. It can also be asked whether customers having receipts for the original albums, such as Fearless, should have been able to buy Taylor’s version at a discount. I submit that such a discount would be reasonable, given both the amount of additional work on Taylor’s part and the substance of the product (i.e., the extent to which it differs from the originals). A few songs from the vault and some new lyrics do not render the albums commensurate with albums filled with previously unreleased songs.

If Swift’s motivation was indeed to gain control of her songs, she should have agreed to a discount. Fearless (Taylor’s Version) had the biggest debut for any album in 2021, with 722.7 million on-demand streams in the U.S. that year.[5] Surely at least some of those customers already possessed the original album. Of course, the irrational exuberance that would cause such a customer to buy the same songs again can also be criticized, but many of her customers were teenagers and thus easily taken in even by orchestrated hype of good feeling seemingly aloft from the earthly taint of business strategizing. My point is that it is no accident that Taylor Swift made a lot of money essentially recycling songs ready for re-singing. She was not merely trying to regain control over her work. I submit that she was acting as a business woman, and a darn good one at that.  Her true identity—her driving financial ambition—was practically hidden under the blinding glitter of the “nuclear fusion” that Time magazine describes. My point is that the resulting sonic boom was orchestrated to coordinate and max out both the hype and the revenue. Behind the moral cause, behind the curtains, Swift’s financial acumen could be said to be a subterranean force of nature.

Such a force tends to be obscured, obfuscated, or, more often, intentionally hidden in the American entertainment industry. Similarly, elected representatives in Congress or the White House keep both their fowl tongues and their raw desire for power far away from the reach of microphones and cameras. In short, the sheer difference between private personas, including agendas, motivations, and even personalities, and the public images on the societal stage is astounding. Especially in politics in a representative democracy, this differential is a real problem that goes beyond the financial harm to young “Swifties” who have been subtly manipulated into buying (mostly recycled) songs at full price.

---

1. Jordan Valinsky, “Taylor Swift Named Time’s ‘Person of the Year,” CNN.com, December 6, 2023.
2. Maria Sherman, "Taylor Swift's Eras Tour Is the First Tour to Gross Over $1 Billion, Pollster Says," APNews.com, December 8, 2023.

3. Valinsky, “Taylor Swift Named Time’s ‘Person of the Year.”
4. Mariah Espada, “Taylor Swift Is Halfway Through Her Rerecording Project. It’s Paid Off Big Time,” Time, July 6, 2023.
5. Ibid.

Is Corporate Governance Anti-Democratic?

Assuming all the votes cast in an election are accurately tallied, the pronouncement of the winner would seem to be straight-forward. What it means to have won, however, is considerably more complex. Specifically, is winning getting over 50% of the vote, or should a mere plurality of, say, 38% suffice? It could be argued that a super-majority of 60% or two-thirds is necessary for there to be a discernible will of the people behind the winner. To claim that 51% represents the will of the people seems a bit of a stretch, since almost half of the voters cannot be considered to be of that will. Typically, much is read (or projected) into the 1% over the 50% in terms of a mandate. All of a sudden, 51% of the voters become “the people.”  Certainly a winning plurality of 38% cannot be said to stand for or represent the will of the people, for 38% is a minority in the total votes cast. Yet in Delaware’s corporate law, which is binding for most American corporations, a mere plurality is sufficient for a candidate to be elected to a board of directors. While this arrangement is not ideal, it is a legitimate basis even if some stockholder activists beg to differ.
Writing for the New York Times in April 2013, James Stewart defines losing a board election as “more than 50 percent of the shareholders withheld[ing] their votes of approval.” Stewart expresses his amazement that 41 boards retained directors whose pluralities in 2012 were tantamount to a resounding vote of no confidence--meaning that those directors got less than 50 percent of the votes cast. According to Stewart, those directors “actually lost their elections” and yet were allowed to remain on the boards. It sounds corrupt as well as anti-democratic. “As fiduciaries, we can’t sit by and let the board make a mochery of our fundamental right to elect directors,” John Liu, New York City’s comptroller, said in reference to Cablevision Systems. As manager of the city’s pension funds, which are invested as more than 532,000 shares in the company, Liu wrote to the company concerning three directors whose pluralities were significantly less than majorities. “The fact that all three directors remain on the board suggests that one of the few rights” afforded shareholders is “illusory,” he wrote. The company’s management did not respond. Moreover it nominated the three directors for yet another term.
Although Liu is on solid ground that insiders should not be allowed to subvert director elections. However, he is wrong in his assumption that plurality voting is not legitimate under democratic auspices. Plurality simply means that the candidate with the most votes gets elected to the given seat. Were a board to turn around and award the seat to a candidate who did not get the most votes, that would be illegitimate from the standpoint of democratic principles.
The question here is not that of legitimacy. More to the point, the question regards how much of the total vote on a seat should be sufficient for the candidate with the most votes to deserve the seat from the standpoint of the stockholders. If there are several candidates and none gets the percentage deemed by the stockholders to be sufficient, then presumably a run-off would be held.
Even though a plurality is a legitimate criterion from democratic principles, it may play into the dominance that many managements have over “their” respective boards of directors.   Where there is no stockholder-nominated candidate, management’s nominee can be elected all too easily even without much stockholder approval. Even the presence of stockholder-nominated candidates would not necessarily solve the problem; management could see to it that several “stockholder-nominated” candidates spread out the anti-management vote so the management-nominated candidate can obtain a plurality. Rather than being anti-democratic, that is merely politics.
From the stockholder standpoint, the political solution would be to up the bar on the percentage of votes cast that a candidate must have in order to be elected. Put another way, the dominance in corporate governance typically enjoyed by management (unless management really screws up) could be reduced by routinizing stockholder nominations and increasing the percentage needed for a candidate to be elected.

Source:

James Stewart, “When Shareholder Democracy Is Sham Democracy,” The New York Times, April 12, 2013.

The Basis of American Aristocracy: Wealth & Property

In the constitutional convention of the United States in 1787, the property-interests were well-represented. Even so, a fear of a plutocracy was voiced by those property-protectors as well. While one might conclude at first glance that the wealthy delegates were duplicitous, their position is not self-contradictory, even if the bias toward wealth is discomforting for those of us who value representative democracy.

Governeur Morris, on July 5, asserted that property is “the main object of Society.” (1) Rutlidge, on July 5, concurred, maintaining, “Property was certainly the principal object of Society.” (2) Hamilton, on June 26, argued that the “inequality of property constituted the great & fundamental distinction in Society.” (3) King, on July 6 averred that “property was the primary object of Society.” (4) In Morris’ view, property is thus “the main object of [Government].” (5) Hamilton articulated this view in the Federalist by writing that the adoption of the Constitution will afford additional security “to the preservation of [republican] government, to liberty and to property.” (6) “I am convinced,” he writes, “that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity and your happiness.” (7) So his statement that “the vigour of government is essential to the security of liberty” can be read as a plea for a General Government primarily to protect property interests. (8) Butler, on July 11, claimed likewise that government is “instituted principally for the protection of property.” (9) At the very least, these remarks evince a reductionism wherein society and government were viewed in terms of wealth. Shouldering a minority view on this point, Wilson, on July 13 in the convention, “could not agree that property was the sole or the primary object of [Government] & society. The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most noble object.” (10) This object, he suggested, is a personal right. (11) As much as this object is laudatory, it is not the object of government, which I contend is to provide and ensure order, which goes beyond the protection of property. If there is a higher purpose, government can express and operationalize societal ideals, which can thus orient whatever order government provides.

The primary result of the delegates’ property-centric view was the formation of a General Government of the U. States to counter the risk that State legislatures would act democractically at odds with the interests of the wealthy. Just a year before the convention, the Massachusetts legislature had attempted to act in the interest of debtors (i.e., unpaid soldiers who were still expected to pay on their farm debts; the representatives sought to stop this injustice at the expense of the creditors). Shays’ Rebellion was the unhappy result. Govereur Morris, on July 2, alluded to this affront on property interests in stating, “Every man of observation had seen in the democratic branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation—in Congress changeableness, in every department excesses [against] personal liberty [,] private property & personal safety.” (12) However, what if private property is acquired unjustly at the expense of another’s liberty? In other words, liberty may run counter to the interests of the rich.

Madison, on June 26 in the convention, remarked that “we had not among us those hereditary distinctions, … nor those extremes of wealth or poverty which characterize [the modern States in Europe]… . An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings… . a leveling spirit… the future danger.” (13) Leveling would actually be in line with liberty if wealth has been acquired unjustly, as for example, under duress. Moreover, too great an inequality of wealth can threaten the viability of a republic. For example, in 1985, the top five percent in the U.S. held $8 trillion in wealth. By 2007, they had $40 trillion. Besides being in part from the dot.com and housing bubbles wherein asset values were overvalued, the concentration of wealth cannot but undermine representative democracy wherein each person has one vote. Interestingly, even as they sought to protect their wealth from being leveled via representative democracy, the delegates also feared that the U. States would end up as a plutocracy (i.e., ruled by the wealthy who would be our aristocracy). Governeur Morris, on July 2, expressed the following. “Let the rich mix with the poor and in a Commercial Country, they will establish an oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the democracy will triumph. Thus it has been all the world over. So it will be among us.” (14) Madison reports that Morris feared “the influence of the rich.” (15) That the U.S. was even then an extended republic on the scale of an empire was thought, at least by Morris, to strength the ability of the rich to rule.  “The schemes of the Rich,” he maintained, “will be favored by the extent of the Country. The people in such distant parts can not communicate & act in concert. They will be the dupes of those who have more knowledge & intercourse.” (16) Govereur Morris, on July 2, maintained that “The Rich will take advantage of their passions & make these the instruments for oppressing them. The Result of the Contest will be a violent aristocracy, or a more violent despotism.” (17)

Madison reports that Morris’ “creed was that there never was, nor ever will be a civilized Society without an aristocracy. His endeavor was to keep it as much as possible from doing mischief.” (18) To contain such mischief (and to protect property-rights), the delegates wanted the proposed U.S. Senate to represent the interests of the wealthy (as well as wisdom and the state governments—a combination they problematically assumed would play well together in the Senate). Govereur Morris, on July 2, claimed that “The Rich will strive to establish their dominion & enslave the rest. They always did. They always will. The proper security [against] them is to form them into a separate interest.” (19) Accordingly, Davy, on July 6, urged that “wealth or property ought to be represented in the [second] branch.” (20)

The Senate was to be a conservative institution, wherein the vested property interests must sign off on any reform.  This could partially explain why passing health-insurance reform in 2010 was so arduous (and why extant health-insurance companies were able to kill off a competing public option). It could also explain why the wealthy could insist that their tax cuts be extended even as the U.S. Government was facing another deficit over $1 trillion also in 2010.

In short, the delegates to the constitutional convention were concerned that a “leveling danger” not be allowed to redistribute wealth even as they feared the advent of a plutocracy as essentially aristocratic governance. Government should protect wealth but not be run by it. In modern terms, this position might seem familiar as: CEO’s like Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs should not run the government, but the latter should not be used by those without to take from the wealthy. Yet as the CEOs’ agents in government essentially operate in the interest of the corporations and the wealthy, does not the government’s orientation to property already evince a plutocracy by a moneyed aristocracy? If so, Jefferson and Adams, who were for a natural aristocracy of talent and virtue rather than money (the latter being an “artificial aristocracy,” which the two founders believed was taking hold in the U. States even in the early 1800's), would doubtless demur. It is telling for us that government protecting wealth is virtually taken for granted among the American people even as the fear of an impending plutocracy and moneyed aristocracy is nearly absent. Any balance from the delegates’ two fears has dissolved in favor of property. The bias is so ingrained in American society and government that it has become invisible.

1. James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Norton, 1987, p. 244

2. Ibid., pp. 245

3. Ibid., p. 196

4. Ibid., pp. 247

5. Ibid., p. 244

6. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #1, in Jacob E. Cooke, The Federalist, Hanover, N.H.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961, p. 7

7. Ibid., p. 6

8. Ibid., p. 5

9. James Madison, Notes, p. 268

10. Ibid., p. 287

11. Ibid., p. 287
12. Ibid., pp. 233

13. Ibid., p. 194

14. Ibid., pp. 233-34

15. Ibid., pp. 235

16. Ibid., pp. 235

17. Ibid., p. 235

18. Ibid., p. 251

19. Ibid., p. 233

20. Ibid., pp. 248

Wall Street Banks: Price-Making and Law-Breaking?

The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found in 2011 that “two Goldman employees, Deeb Salem and David Swenson, tried to manipulate prices of securities used to bet against mortgages. Both tried to help Goldman pile on larger bets against the mortgage market, and they wanted to be able to buy such negative bets more cheaply, the report said. Goldman, as a broker, was able to affect prices in the market through the bids and offers it gave out. Mr. Swenson wrote in May 2007 that the bank should try to ‘start killing’ prices on certain positions so that Goldman would be able to ‘pick some high quality stuff,’ according to the Senate report. The strategy, Mr. Swenson wrote, would ‘have people totally demoralized.’ The pair were unsuccessful in their attempt, and both denied making it to the Senate committee. Mr. van Praag said last week that the report had no evidence of manipulation. Still, the Senate report said that ‘trading with the intent to manipulate market prices, even if unsuccessful, is a violation of the federal securities laws.’”[1] I submit that it was also unethical. 


The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available at Amazon.com.

1. Louise Story and Gretchen Morgenson, “S.E.C. Case Stands Out Because It Stands Alone,” The New York Times, May 31, 2011.

Partisan Journalism at Fox News: Stockholders and Democracy

Roger Ailes “is the most successful executive in television by a wide margin, and he has been so for more than a decade. He is also, in a sense, the head of the Republican Party, having employed five prospective presidential candidates and done perhaps more than anyone to alter the balance of power in the national media in favor of the Republicans. ‘Because of his political work’—Ailes was a media strategist for Nixon, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush—‘he understood there was an audience,’ Ed Rollins, the veteran GOP consultant, [said in 2011]. [Ailes] knew there were a couple million conservatives who were a potential audience, and he built Fox to reach them.’ For most of his tenure, the roles of network chief and GOP kingmaker have been in perfect synergy. Ailes’s network has dominated the cable news race for most of the past decade, and for much of that time, Fox News attracted more viewers than CNN and MSNBC combined. Throughout the George W. Bush years, the network’s patriotic cheerleading helped to marginalize the Democrats. . . . The problem wasn’t that ratings had been slipping that much— [Glenn] Beck’s show declined by 30 percent from record highs, but the ratings were still nearly double those from before he joined the network. It was that, with an actual presidential election on the horizon, the Fox candidates’ poll numbers remain dismally low (Sarah Palin is polling 12 percent; Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum, 10 percent and 2 percent, respectively). Ailes’s ­candidates-in-­waiting were coming up small. And, for all his programming genius, he was more interested in a real narrative than a television narrative—he wanted to elect a president.”[1] The last sentence of the quoted passage is particularly revealing: “(H)e wanted to elect a president.”  With Beck’s 30% drop in ratings still leaving him with a profitable rating, Ailes’ motive was not commercial, neither was it to improve the network’s journalism. Typically, news networks are criticized for sacrificing good journalism for commercial interests. Here, journalistic integrity and profit played second fiddle to partisan objectives. 

The full essay is at "Partisan Journalism."

1, Gabriel Sherman, “The Elephant in the Green Room,” New York Magazine, May 22, 2011.

The Revolving Door: A Public-Private Sector Conflict of Interest

In Illinois, at least as late as 2011, state and local legislators could use their position to benefit paying clients. According to The New York Times, fourteen elected officials in Cook County, where Chicago is located, were registered as lobbyists in the 2009-2011 period and had clients who did received government contracts in Illinois. Rep. Fred Crespo observes, “When I see them [the law makers] at a hearing in the Capitol, I often can’t tell of they’re here for their constituents or for their paying clients.” Legislators in Illinois “can legally vote and otherwise act on matters that directly benefit their lobbying clients.”[1] As this involves a conflict of interest, which is inherently unethical, this case demonstrates for us the contention of ethicists that ethics as a field is distinct from law.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Mike McIntire and Michael Luo, “When Santorum Left Senate, Some He Aided Found Him Work,” The New York Times, January 6, 2011; John Sullivan and Fredric Tulsky, “When Office Holders Also Represent Clients, Collisions Are Likely,” The New York Times, January 6, 2011; and Fredric Tulsky and John Sullivan, “Is It a Conflict? Yes, But It’s Legal,” The New York Times, January 6, 2011.