"(T)o say that the individual is culturally constituted has become a truism. . . . We assume, almost without question, that a self belongs to a specific cultural world much as it speaks a native language." James Clifford
Showing posts with label energy sector. Show all posts
Showing posts with label energy sector. Show all posts

Thursday, September 17, 2026

On the Transition to Clean Energy: Heedlessly Modest, Hardly Draconian

Spurred on by the myriad inventions from the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the related consumer demand for the conveniences, the Industrial Revolution itself played a major role in what would come to be known as global warming or climate change. In 2015, the Paris Agreement stipulated, notably without any enforcement, a global temperature rise of 1.5C as a ceiling. Just a decade later, scientists were saying that the threshold would be exceeded. Even amid the searing heat in the E.U. during the summer of 2026, the fear around the world in halls of government was less oriented to the what the new normal climatically would bring than to whether Iran would block the Strait of Hormuz, which was known as an oil checkpoint through which over 20 billion barrels of oil were being transported per day. It was as though our species no longer had any control over how far global warming would go.

Just after that summer, “the UN warmed that it is no longer possible to keep global warming below 1.5C.”[1] Simon Steill, of the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), pointed to what he called the “spiralling costs of the climate crisis caused by humanity’s addiction to burning coal, oil, and gas.”[2] A report by Climate Central had recently “found that nearly nine in 10 Europeans experienced a month’s worth of ‘risky heat’ during the June-August period, making [Europe] the most ‘unusually hot place on the planet.’”[3] Whether from this, or that “hundreds of millions [of people were] impacted across Asia and Africa,” or the “relentless record-breaking temperatures in North America,” it was clear, at least to Kristina Dahl at Climate Central “that “human-driven warning is pushing communities beyond safe physical limits.”[4] The Paris Agreement had not plucked 1.5C arbitrarily out of a hat; that governments had not taken the threshold seriously enough in terms of quickly shifting from fossil fuels to clean sources of energy was already taken a noticeable toll on the species. As the E.U. was warming at double that of the planet as a whole in 2026, a report by the UN Environment projected “a best-case 1.8C of warming and over 2C in other scenarios. ‘Overshoot, peak and decline’ is now our best bet,’” the report states.[5] Electorates and government officials around the world had not stepped up to the (baseball) plate to make hard political choices, and the parts-per-million of carbon in the atmosphere were still increasing as if there had not been an agreement in Paris in 2015.

Even though in 2025, “wind and solar generated more EU electricity than fossil fuels for the first time, marking a major milestone in the transition to clean power . . . green power only [met] around 40 per cent of the increase in [energy] demand” due in part to “energy-intensive air conditioning and the boom in artificial intelligence.”[6] That same year, a consultant with BP told a small group at Yale that even with the increased use of clean energy sources worldwide, the year’s increase in the demand for energy was greater.

At the very end of the summer of 2026, U.S. President announced that the U.S. had majority control of more than 65 billion barrels of proven Venezuelan oil reserves. The deal was oriented to reducing the price of gas for Americans; the supply disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz had driven up the global price of oil, and Americans were paying the price in driving and flying. Lower oil and gas prices would translate into more demand for and use of fossil fuels, and thus more carbon emissions; an even warmer atmosphere and oceans could be expected. The deal marks a clear divergence from the urging by scientists that the world should transition as much and as soon as possible to clean energy. That summer had showed Europeans and even the world hearing of heat wave after heat wave in the E.U. just what putting off a transition that would at least cover the annual increase in the world’s energy demand looks like.

It would be ironic were the large and increasing energy-draw from AI computing and data-storage putting our species’ survival at risk. Securing access to more oil and building AI data-centers as if they were popcorn represent gross negligence, given the “intel” coming out of the UN and Climate Central in 2026. As a species, we can develop technology by leaps and bounds, adding great convenience and sheer fun to living, but if our species goes extinct, the fruits of our innovativeness will be for naught as our descendants struggle to survive or die outright at some generation. The summer of 2026 suggests that the bill from our species’ penchant for instant energy-gratification was already coming due, and yet more AI centers were being built especially in the U.S., and President Trump scored a lot more oil for the American consumers, whose sight was narrowly fixed on the weekly price increases at the pump and to fly.  



1. Liam Gilliver, “Europe Was the ‘Most Unusually Hot Place on the Planet’ This Summer. Can Renewables Cool Us Down?” Euronews.com, 17 September, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. “Researchers defined ‘risky heat’ as days that were hotter than 90 per cent of what a local area experienced between 1991 and 2020 for this time of year, representing the point at which health risks from extreme heat begins to rise.” This metric may, however, be flawed with respect to the E.U.’s northern states such as Finland and Sweden because of their relatively low 1991-2020 bases. Being hotter than those may not be so hot for the human body, whereas hotter than the bases in the E.U. states of Greece and Spain could be expected to have adverse biological impacts. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Sunday, January 18, 2015

Oil Supply: Problem or Panacea?

Between June 2014 and January 14, 2015, crude oil prices fell by 57 percent. Between November 1985 and March 1986, the prices had fallen by 67 percent.[1] That time, it took nearly two decades for oil prices to rebound. Would it take that long again? The answer has implications for how efficient the market mechanism itself is, and in turn for public policy on energy and global warming.

According to The Wall Street Journal, the discovery of oil in shale rock makes all the difference. The difficult question involves what that difference might be. With less time entailed from discovery to extraction, and less cost relative to the more traditional sources such as off-shore oil, the supply of oil on the market should be able to adjust downward much quicker, resulting in higher crude prices, other things equal. For example, wildcatters in Texas discovered the Eagle Ford Shale in 2008; within only five years, a million barrels a day were going to market.[2] “Faster-reacting shale production could help cut supply more quickly than in the past, restoring market balance without a decadeslong wait.”[3] This assumes the efficient market hypothesis—that suppliers quickly reduce their respective contributions to the market as a result of lower prices.

So it is surprising that the Journal cautions that the faster-reacting shale production does not necessarily “mean prices will rebound soon, or return to the triple-digit levels . . . Price pressure may need to remain on the U.S. oil industry and its lenders for months to rein in supply.”[4] Andrew Hall, who runs a $3 billion energy derivatives hedge fund, wrote to investors that it is unclear how long it would take for American suppliers to cut back due to the lower prices and even what the new price-equilibrium would be.[5]
For one thing, oil producers sunk into contracts would rather get as much revenue as they can, even if they will still lose money. Although shale producers have a shorter timeframe, the short life of a given well means that the producers are under pressure to start new wells in order to cover as much of the initial investment as possible. Put another way, keeping production up is the better of two bad options.

With the tap expected to remain open, the supply of oil from shale was predicted to peak in 2020, after which the annual decrease in oil from liquid sources would be less and less made up by oil from shale. By 2030, the production from liquid sources could be only half of its level in 2014, with no oil left from shale. In short, the lack of a drastic downturn in supply during the last half of 2014 suggests that the American economy might suffer shocks in the 2020s as oil prices skyrocket from dramatically reduced supplies. With alternative energy representing only about 3% of the total in 2014, even increased investment in wind and solar facilities would not counter the anticipated drop in oil supplies.

Had the oil market in 2014 been more in keeping with the efficient market hypothesis—with supplies dropping drastically as the prices of crude drop likewise until the reduced supply pushes the prices back, up at least partially—the anticipated “cliff” in the early 2020s could be either flatter or delayed. Policy makers would have more time to get the economic “up to steam” on alternative sources of energy. Already in 2014, when I was driving across the Midwest, I was stunned by the number (and size) of “wind fields.” Even so, considering that carbon emissions were at the time going in the wrong direction—up instead of down—the continued supply of oil in spite of the lower prices must have been relieving pressure on policy makers to reduce the reliance on fossil fuels. Meanwhile, the lower gas prices gave American consumers the misperception that oil supplies are just fine and a lack of incentive to obviate global warming above the 2C degree threshold.

In short, the lack of an efficient market was forestalling vital public policies concerning both the American economy and climate change. It is not that an efficient market would obviate government action. In fact, just the opposite.





[1] Russell Gold, “Back to the Future? Oil Replays 1980s,” The Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2015.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.