Beyond Climate Change: Starbucks Awash in Cash

While it may be tempting to go after companies for hypocrisy on corporate social responsibility, even deeper criticism may be closer to the bottom line, financially. Even though social media castigated Starbucks for its impact on carbon emissions in agreeing to fly its Southern Californian CEO Brian Niccol to Seattle on a company plane each week, I submit that the amount of spending entailed raises questions about cost-containment and even cast some doubt on whether the company’s price increases in 2024 were wholly justified, and thus even on whether the industry was competitive or an oligarchy.

Before Niccol was to assume his role as CEO on September 9, 2024, Starbucks announced that he would “not be required to relocate to the company’s headquarters” during his employment with the company.[1] Because he would be expected to work at the Seattle office at least three days a week to comply with the company’s policy on hybrid working, he would be flying a distance greater than that which is between Berlin and Rome on a company plane weekly. Why could he not fly commercial (business class) and thereby save the company a lot of money? Is a CEO really above such flying?

I suspect that in the E.U. the answer would be more down-to-earth, or realistic, than in the U.S., where CEO’s are more likely to be reckon as akin to divine emperors. Whereas in Europe, an aristocracy exists that can put the moneyed caste in its proper place, American CEOs reside at the top of the societal pyramid. Being consumed with thoughts of money is valued rather than presumed low. This is not to say that inherited wealth is value-free and thus exempt from a different criticism. Rather, my point is that CEO’s of American companies can get away with being treated like royalty on account of the relatively pro-business (or business-leaning) societal culture.

Rather than criticizing Starbucks for spending too much money on its CEO’s transportation, users of social media expressed anger over the company’s preachments on sustainability while the CEO is to be flown on a private plane weekly, burning thousands of liters of fuel in the atmosphere. On its website, the company claimed that it had “a bold aspiration to be a resource positive company.”[2] The CEO of Conservation International stated that the company was backing up its “commitments with immediate actions to reduce [its] footprint and invest in nature.”[3] The hypocrisy could have been easily obviated by having the CEO fly business in a commercial airline.

It is not as if Niccol would not be able to afford the flights, as his annual salary was announced as $1.6 million, not including a possible performance-related bonus of up to $7.2 million and up to $23 million a year in company stock.[4] Of course, the company would no doubt cover the cost of its CEO’s commute, whether commercial or on a company plane, and such money, together with his compensation-level, suggests that Starbucks had money to burn in 2024 even as it was increasing the prices of its drink products.

In 2023, the CEO-to-worker pay ratio in the United States had increased to 251:1, which was up 26% from 2022. Back in 1965, CEOs were paid on average just 21 times more than the medium worker. In 2021, Chipotle, where Niccol had worked prior to becoming CEO of Starbucks, was at 2,998:1, which was the fifth highest in the United States. I suspect that he had rather high expectations in negotiating with Starbucks. That the company relented even as it felt the need to increase drink prices (presumably to keep afloat financially) is a point that the carbon-emission critics missed.

Considering the rise in prices at restaurants and grocery stores since the pandemic of 2020, it is worthy of note societally that a company raising prices would have enough cash on hand to fly one person weekly on a company plane instead of having him fly commercial (and on his own dime!). That is to say, one might wonder how legitimate the rising prices of food (and drink) were even after the pandemic. In competitive markets, new entrants can offer more competitive prices and thus bring down prices generally in an industry, such that the companies cannot afford to be extravagant in spending. Starbucks may simply have been raising prices because it could get away with it, and could thus afford to fly its CEO on a company plane weekly not only to the company’s headquarters, but on visits to company stores and brewing facilities on a regular basis.

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1. “Anger Boils Up over Starbucks CEO 1600km ‘Super Commute’ on Private Jet,” Euronews, August 23, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Walmart: Encroaching on Employees' Private Lives

In 2023, Walmart relaxed its policy requiring anyone applying for a job at the company to get a drug test, including for marijuana, which at the time was legal in several U.S. member states. Once hired, however, employees were still subject to random testing. An employee in a member state in which the drug is legal could be fired even if the person is never affected by the drug while working. I contend that the practice is unfair, unethical, and an over-reach in terms of the nature of a labor contract. 

The ethical principle of fairness is violated because both marijuana and alcohol can impair the brain and yet the company only tests for one even where both drugs are legal. An argument can be made that the alcoholic personality is less than suitable, and yet taking marijuana outside of work (with no impact during work hours) is reason enough for an employee to be fired. Whereas alcohol can inducive hostility and even aggression, marijuana has a calming drug—something that could actually help busy cashiers.

Besides being unfair, the policy of even random tests for marijuana is invasive, beyond the legitimate scope of an employer’s reach—assuming that the employee using marijuana is never “high” at work. In selling one’s labor, an employee does not agree to a company’s management being able to control the employee’s legal activities outside of work if those activities do not affect the employee’s work. Sam Walton, the founder of Walmart, was against marijuana; for him to impose his ideological opposition on others where the drug is legal was over-reaching and impious; he was not a god. An argument can also be made that it is none of the company’s business, literally and figuratively, whether an employee uses the drug where it is illegal, again as long as the employee is not “high” at work. Law enforcement is the job of police, not a company’s managers. Of course, if an employee is convicted of a crime, an employer may not permit convicted employees to continue. In the case of Walmart, it hires people who have criminal records, which shows just how nonsensical the policy of random testing for marijuana is (especially as more and more U.S. member states legalize recreational use of the drug). In terms of a contract between an employer and an employee, an employer who presumes to dictate an employee’s recreational activities imposes a cost on employees that is not offset by the monetary compensation.

Imagine what would happen if a labor union informed a company’s management that an abrasive supervisor must be subject to drug and alcohol tests and fired for any positive results, or else the employees would strike. Suppose too that the supervisor does indeed have a problem with alcohol, but is not under its influence while at work. Still the union insists that the company fire that person. Suddenly, the company’s management would object with a mighty roar, How dare employees tell us what we cannot do on our days off! The nerve! Well, it goes both ways, folks. The attitude is the same: the unethical vice of invasiveness (in peoples’ personal, not work-related lives) is noxious and may even point to a toxic organizational culture.

See: Walmart: Bad Management as Unethical

Starbucks: A Racist Company Against Racism

In June, 2023, Starbucks had to face a unanimous jury decision in favor of a regional manager whom Starbucks' upper management had fired because she had resisted the company's racist policy of punishing innocent Caucasian managers for good public relations, which the CEO felt was needed and appropriate after a store manager had legitimately called the police on two Black people in a Starbucks restaurant who presumed the right not only to sit in a restaurant without ordering anything (before Starbucks allowed this),  but also to ignore the authority of the store's manager. Starbucks cowered to the unjust negative publicity, and thus showed a lack of leadership, and went on to act unethically in wanting to show the world that the company can go after Caucasian employees. This racism is ironic, for several years earlier, Starbucks' CEO had ordered employees at the store level to discuss racism with customers. Interestingly, the anti-racist ideology being preached was partial, and thus contained a blind spot wherein racism such as the company's upper management would exhibit is acceptable. 

As the CEO of Starbucks, Howard Schultz had employees promote his political ideology on two social issues: gay marriage and race. Regarding the latter, he ordered employees, whom he artfully called partners, to write race messages on cups so customers would unknowingly enable employees to impart Schultz’s position on the issue by raising the topic. I assume that the employees could not begin such conversations. I have argued elsewhere that Schultz’s use of the employees for such a purpose was not only extrinsic to making coffee as per the employees’ job descriptions, but also unethical.[1] In terms of corporate governance alone, the shareholders, as the owners of the company, should have decided whether to have their company used to promote partisan positions on social issues. In 2023, Target and Budweiser would learn of the perils in wandering off the knitting to get political on social issues. In terms of jurisprudence, the “right” of a company, a legal entity, to have free speech is dubious, as abstract entities, even if legally recognized as such, are not human beings. Rather, the “free speech” claimed by companies is really that of the human beings who work for the companies. Using an abstract entity that itself cannot speak to gain additional publicity for one’s ideological views is unfair because the vaulted or amplified speakers are not so from a democratic standpoint. In short, why should Howard Schultz have access to a megaphone and employees to propagate his political ideology on social issues, when you and I have no such means of self-amplification? Whether we agree or disagree with the former CEO’s political ideology on race is not relevant to my point. To be sure, that his employees were told to speak against racism is in my opinion much better than had they been told to advocate racism against Black people. That Starbucks would then engage in racism is that much harder to understand, but perhaps the hypocrisy reflects a hidden negative aspect of Schultz’s ideology on race. American society could benefit by having that aspect uncovered; such a benefit vastly outweighs any benefit to business. Even in a pro-business culture, a lower good should not be put over a higher one. Aristotle refers to this error as misordered concupiscence.

In June, 2023, a jury in New Jersey “found in favor of former Starbucks regional director Shannon Phillips, who sued the company for wrongfully firing her, claiming she was terminated for being White.”[2] The company’s position was that Phillis’ boss fired her because she had displayed weak leadership. The use of such vague jargon as leadership for what is actually management is itself problematic. Even if Phillips had “appeared overwhelmed and lacked awareness of how critical the situation had become,” as her boss presumably had written, does not constitute weak leadership, for she was not in a leadership role[3]; instead, the company’s CEO should have got out in front of the issue and provided a vision for the company.[4] If Schultz was the CEO at the time, the failure of his leadership would be especially telling, considering his earlier foray into politics using the company to promote his ideology.

The triggering incident that had overwhelmed Phillips, according to her boss, whom the CEO at the time must agree in retrospect failed as a supervisor but presumably was not fired, involved two Black men who had refused to leave a Starbucks store in 2018 even though they would not purchase anything. They were thus not customers, and the incident occurred before the company allowed non-purchasers to be in the stores. That the two Black men refused to leave the company’s private property means they were trespassing, so the store manager was on solid legal grounds in having the local police remove the men from the store. Being Black, even if that race has been (and is) subject to racism generally, does not give a person the right to trespass on private property, and efforts to remove such trespassing is not racist, for anyone trespassing would be legally subject to removal from the property. 

I contend that Howard Schultz’s notion of racial reconciliation suffers from the weakness of being blind to the racial presumption displayed by the two Blacks. In having employees talk about the need not to be racist to customers, Schultz was assuming that racism is something that non-Blacks do to Blacks. Employees were not told to suggest to Black customers that being Black does not give them special exemptions from the law or in society. Schultz could have had employees suggest to Black customers that jay-walking between intersections in a major street even if cars are coming is not “a Black thing” that is justified because the race in general has been subject to discrimination. Furthermore, the use of the word, nigga, cannot be allowed only if the speaker is Black, for that would be a racist position. For a Black person who uses the word to become hostile or aggressive towards an Indian, Oriental, or Caucasian who also uses the word is itself racist (and of course the hostility is unjustified unless the related word nigger is used in a hostile manner). The U.S. Constitution does not indicate that free speech depends or is limited by race; such a clause would be prime facie racist.

Phillips’ complaint, which the jury accepted unanimously, states that following the arrest of the two Black men, Starbucks “took steps to punish White employees who had not been involved in the arrests, but who worked in and around the city of Philadelphia, in an effort to convince the community that it had properly responded to the incident.”[5] Phillips was ordered “to place a White employee on administrative leave as part of these efforts, due to alleged discriminatory conduct which Phillips said she knew was inaccurate. After Phillips tried to defend the employee, the company let her go.”[6] It does not sound like Phillips was overwhelmed; in fact, she was being pro-active and ethical in defending an employee from an unjust punishment. The implication is that the person who fired Phillips acted unethically.

Moreover, in being willing to sacrifice Caucasian employees based on their race for good public relations, the company’s upper managers were being racist. An unseen implication is that those managers believed that the public reaction against the company for having the two Black men removed from the store in Philadelphia had some validity—that Black people should not be treated like that or that Black people deserve special treatment due to their race. But such a belief is itself racist. Schutz’s talking points for his employees to discuss with customers on race did not include mention of the racism in such beliefs. Moreover, he did not have the company’s employees talk about racism by Black people stemming from resentment. Any ideology is partial, rather than whole, and even claim of being against racism can fall short. In going after Caucasian employees, including Phillips, Starbucks’ upper managers fell short; the failure of leadership ultimate belongs to the CEO at the time. At least at the time of the trial, Howard Schultz was the CEO.

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1. Skip Worden, Bucking Starbucks’ Star.

2. Danielle Wiener-Bronner, “Starbucks Ordered to Pay $25.6 million to a Manager Who Says She Was Fired for Being White,” CNN.com, June 14, 2023.

3. Ibid.

4. Skip Worden, The Essence of Leadership.

5. Danielle Wiener-Bronner, “Starbucks Ordered to Pay $25.6 million to a Manager Who Says She Was Fired for Being White.

6. Ibid.

A Professional Misnomer: Everyone Is a Self-Proclaimed Professional!

Certainly by the turn of (and well into) the twenty-first century, the term, "professional" had become such a cherished word in the American lexicon that every American had decided that he or she is one. Evincing the Lake Wobegon effect—the tendency of most people to describe themselves or their abilities as above average—nearly everyone is wont to say, “I am a professional.” On housing listings on Craigslist, for example, people routinely use the word to signify that they are not students. In fact, even some students characterize themselves as professionals (though not as professional students!). Such common usage belies the term's claim to having a specific meaning. Moreover, the tendency of non-professions to deem themselves as professions nonetheless may evince one of the downsides of democracy—namely, its proclivity to excess in terms of self-entitlement. This is particularly likely to ensue from a citizenry that is lacking in self-discipline, virtue and knowledge. 

I contend that the self-appellation of “professional” is in actuality an attempt at inclusion in what was hitherto known as “the professional class.” Nietzsche’s thesis is relevant regarding the instinct of certain herd animals to dominate as if they were strong—even though they are in fact weak. 

It is as though a manager at Walmart imagines a concept of egalitarianism wherein he is akin to a lawyer or surgeon—perhaps based on the fact that the manager distinguishes himself somehow from his subordinate “employees.”  Even in the midst of such self-vaunting, a knowledge of store policies and years of practice in dealing with customer complaints do not constitute an equivalent to the knowledge of law or medicine required of a lawyer and physician, respectively. Nor is there an obligation to the public such as in entailed in the practice of law or medicine.

Technically, the term "professional" applies to “the professions.”  This does not mean “any profession” in the sense of “any job category.” Because a professional relies on years of study, albeit undergraduate (meaning only one degree in a discipline/school of knowledge), in his or her practice, he or she must be allowed significant autonomy. Hence the partnership arrangement, wherein the self-discipline of peerage rather than a boss is relied on, is the typical business form for law firms, CPA firms, and medical offices. Managers in business are not professionals. This can be seen both from the standpoint of the relative salience of a responsibility to the client/customer and of judgment.

According to Relson (p. 750), “the basic social role of the physician . . . is to be an agent and trustee for the patient. Physicians are ethically bound to place the medical care needs of their patients before their own financial interests – an obligation that clearly sets the practice of medicine apart from business.” One could add a lawyer's ethical obligation to act in the interest of the client and the CPA's obligation to act in the interest of the public (people who rely on the financial statements). In business by contrast, "buyer beware" is often the default; a business practioner serves a customer for monetary gain.

Similarly, the judgment of a lawyer, physician or CPA is not easily second-guessed by people outside of the respective profession. Even in a hospital, a physician is not reviewed by a manager who is not also a physician. In contrast, non-managerial board directors commonly review the performance of managers.

Put another way, whereas one can manage a business without having attended business school, I do not think any of us would agree to be seen by a physician who had not graduated from a medical school. Nor would a defendant in a criminal case be likely to chance a conviction (and decades in prison) by hiring a lawyer who had not studied law. Creditors and investors would think twice about the unqualified opinion of a CPA firm whose auditors had not passed the CPA exam after years of study of accounting.  That a certified public accountant might also engage in consulting, however, does not mean that consultants are thereby also professionals. Even were consultants to devise a certifying exam, it would not be as substantive or relied on as the lawyer bar exam, medical boards, and the CPA exam.

According to John Boatright (2008), the "work of most financial services providers does not meet the standard criteria for a profession. Among the criteria for a profession which are lacking in financial services are a high degree of organization and self-regulation, a code of ethics, and a commitment to public service. These criteria are possibly met by financial planners and insurance underwriters, but not by brokers, bankers, traders . . ., who, in the strict sense of the term, are not professionals." Financial planners and insurance underwriters come up short, however, in terms of educational requirements. 

According to Boatright (1992), a professional’s stock in trade is a body of specialized knowledge that is the basis for making judgments. Not only is the reliance placed on a professional’s judgment relatively important; professionals are paid primarily for the value of their knowledge that is the basis for their judgments. Accordingly, it is difficult, if not impossible, anyone other than their peers to evaluate their practice.  In fact, Jean Van Houtte (p. 207) refers to professionals as “individuals who practice their occupation autonomously.” Even another surgeon is limited in being able to second-guess a colleague without being in the operating room at the time. The salient element of judgment includes discretion that is difficult for even colleagues to evaluate (though not impossible); obvious lapses, for example, can easily be discerned by a professional’s peers. 

In short, the term "professional" has a specific and limited meaning centered on the responsibility-autonomy that is entailed when specialized-knowledge-informed-judgment is salient in the practice of an occupation. The term does not apply to anyone who does something for a living (as opposed to being an avocation).  If it did, then even prostitutes and politicians would be professionals.  The term “professional politician” connotes ignorance, for which political office is not a job?  It is not like one can be governor of Alaska as a hobby. Also, neither "mature" nor "responsible” is interchangeable with “professional.” Nor does the term mean “acting impersonally or bureaucratically rather than emotionally.” It is no accident that people not in one of the professions use notably wide criteria.

Until the last few decades of the twentieth century, the term "professional" did not suffer from such lack of clarity. For example, Joe Flom, who was instrumental as a lawyer in the hostle take-over bubble that began in the 1970s, claimed that his parents wanted him to be a "professional." He wrote that for them, "being a professional was a great thing. . . . That meant either a doctor or a lawyer." This was the popular application: medicine or law--not a manager or sales person, or even a CEO. Then a sort of inflation set in, and the value associated with being a “professional” has diminished in proportion. The presumption that simply getting hired or being mature on the job makes a person a professional is odious and false. In fact, the over-reach itself evinces an underlying sordid character. Ironically, such a person is in need of more supervision, rather than warranting any sort of autonomy. 

Sources:

Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 2011).

John R. Boatright, “Conflict of Interest: An Agency Analysis.” Pp. 187-203 in Ethics and Agency Theory: An Introduction, Norman E. Bowie and R. Edward Freeman, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

John R. Boatright, Ethics in Finance (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

Arnold S. Relman, “Dealing with Conflicts of Interest,” New England Journal of Medicine 313 (1985): 749-51.

Jean Van Houtte, “Research Report: Conflicts of Interest in Law Firms in Belgium,” Legal Ethics 12 (part II): 207-28.

See also:

Skip Worden, On the Arrogance of False Entitlement: A Nietzschean Critique of Business Ethics and Management.

Steve Jobs: A Unique Societal and Organizational Visionary

Typically as a company transitions from an enterprising, creative new venture to a large organization to be managed, a staid CEO replaces a visionary founder. In the case of Steve Jobs at Apple, the very nature of the man’s vision was not only inherently at odds with the status-quo underpinning of a large organization with a budget, but also essential to the company’s business model. Hence, the company, including its shareholders, paid a price for years for jettisoning Jobs. The film, Jobs (2013), is centered on the distinctiveness of Jobs’ vision. Although the film also hints at why this distinctiveness is such that the company would (and did) lose as a large organization after making the typical founder-to-CEO transition.

The full essay is at "Jobs."

Executive Compensation (Part II): Paying Failure

In late September 2011, Léo Apotheker was fired after 11 months as CEO at Hewlett-Packard. As a reward, he walked with $13.2 million in cash and stock, in addition to a sign-on package worth about $10 million, according to the New York Times. A month earlier, Robert P. Kelly received severance worth $17.2 in cash and stock when he was fired as CEO of Bank of New York Mellon. Even his clashing with board members and senior managers did not obstruct his nice severance package. A few days later, Carol Bartz was let go as CEO of Yahoo with nearly $10 million in spite of the company’s poor performance. Back in April 2011, John Chidsey, the CEO of Burger King, had departed with a severance package worth almost $20 million in the fact that McDonalds had been outcompeting Burger King. Baxter Phillips, the CEO of Massey Energy, got a package worth over $34 million in spite of “presiding over a company barraged with accusations of reckless conduct and with legal claims stemming from one of the deadliest mining disasters in memory,” according to the New York Times. Unfortunately, the list goes on and on. Is this a system of pay-for-failure? Moreover, do chief executives, who seem to outward appearances to be almost exclusively motivated by what they can get in additional compensation, have too much leverage over boards, and thus over even the owners as well? If so, is corporate governance itself severely broken? I answer in the affirmative.

“We repeatedly see companies’ assets go out the door to reward failure,” Scott Zdrazil, the director of corporate governance at a major bank’s investment fund that sought to tighten the restrictions on severance packages at three oil companies in 2010. He claims that investors are frustrated that boards of directors have not prevented such windfalls. Even the Dodd-Frank financial reform law has its mandated “say on pay” stockholder votes on a non-binding basis. It is as though stockholders have given up their property rights in favor of the “rights” having been taken or assumed by their agents—the directors and upper echelon managers. It is as though the business judgment rule trumps property rights even where the compensation of executives who typically control their boards is at issue. The conflict of interest here is extraordinary even as it is assumed to be obviated by the fiction of board independence from management. To be sure, a board of directors is supposed to hold management accountable.

Don’t look to public policy to shore up the property rights of stockholders any time soon. Eric Dash of the New York Times avers that the Obama administration “seemed to lose its bully pulpit for compensation reform after most of the nation’s biggest financial companies repaid their government loans.” Never mind that the administration allowed at least four of the mega-banks to repay early based on the bankers’ desire to avoid limitations on their own compensation.

The bottom line is that CEOs are not really all that interested in serving the owners of the companies; the top executives are primarily interested in their own gain, be it in terms of position/power or compensation. Structuring the latter in stock options with vesting periods and looking to outside directors for accountability are not sufficient checks on the single-minded pursuit of CEOs of their narrow self-interest. Even when a bank is in dire circumstances, such as Merrill Lynch was on September 15, 2008, a CEO can be obsessed with “letters”—statements on his or her compensation (as well as that of other top execs) being honored by the acquiring company.

As negotiations dragged on into the wee hours of Monday morning, Ken Lewis of Bank of America was utterly disgusted with John Thain’s fixation on what he and others at Merrill would get as bonuses (for a year of losses, by the way), even as Merrill and its stockholders held in the balance after midnight (when Lehman filed for bankruptcy). Lewis could only look over at Thain and think to himself, The only thing these Wall Street guys are concerned about is themselves. Even in the midst of a financial system collapse, Thain was focused on getting what he thought he deserved in spite of the huge losses. In fact, he had put off even talking to Lewis at Bank of America—repeatedly rebuffing his president’s (Fleming) lobbying—because the CEO did not like the idea of having to work for Lewis! Do you suppose the Merrill stockholders wanted to risk their entire investment in the bank because Thain didn’t want to end up working for someone else? The board of directors left the contingency plans up to him, so he didn’t have to worry about any pressure to start merger talks. Merrill’s stockholders were at best an afterthought to him, and yet the directors, who had been elected by the owners, had hired him. The eventual $29 per share price, by the way, was a result of Fleming’s negotiating for the stockholders; Thain was still looking for a line of credit from Goldman—risking an entire loss to stockholders so he could retain control of Merrill rather than turn it over to Lewis.

Even after Merrill Lynch had announced a $5.1 billion loss ($5.56 per diluted share) for the third quarter of 2008, Thain was insisting on a cash bonus of $40 million. Fleming and McCann were to get $25 million, while two other senior managers would get $15 million a piece. Thain subsequently admitted that a $20 million cash bonus for himself would be more "realistic." Given Merrill's losses in 2008 and the fact that the bank had to be sold, it is crazy that any cash bonuses would be paid for any senior manager. Thain's suggestion to the board's compensation committee that the bonuses be viewed as "success fees" for the top managers' efforts in putting together the sale of Merrill to Bank of America is nothing less than bizarre, if not comical. Failure as successs? What planet was Thain from? That a man like him ever got to be the CEO of a major bank (one too big to fail!) suggests that major flaws exist in how business practitioners view and value leadership and in how corporate governance is designed and operates.

When times were good, the finance crowd had lauded Thain as a “superman” for modernizing the NYSE. The business world tends to invent “superheroes”--even calling them rockstars!--while ignoring the more ignoble underbellies of its idols. In other words, leadership is worshipped without any clear grasp of the leaders' real contributions, while failure at the top is generally underplayed or ignored, at least financially speaking. This lack of proportion and balance is not by accident, as it is fully in the financial interests of the so-called "leaders." As for the followers and bystanders, these incredulous groupies--retarded court jesters wearing grizzled suits--happily allow themselves to get played as fools. They are dominated, not led, for the weak can dominate but not lead the herd animals.

Besides pointing to the utter bankruptcy and banality of business leadership, the case of Thain demonstrates that the system of corporate governance in the U.S. is broken even as it continues on as the status quo. Sadly, stockholders as a group are severely over-exposed to risk as a result. As long as top executives get what they believe they are worth, they will see to it, in a “by the way” fashion, that stockholders do not lose everything, but is this enough? Must stockholders (and society itself) settle for this? Are they even aware of the risk to their wealth as CEOs risk all to make sure they are taken care of? In academic terms, the system of corporate governance is incurring huge agency costs, yet I suspect we (and stockholders) are blind to their magnitude. As a society, Americans have a bad habit of taking the word of vested interests, who get away with making excuses or simply opining that there is no problem, after all. We assume that executive compensation is set by the invisible hand of the marketplace because it is in the executives’ financial interest that we take this bait and swim along with it in our gullible mouths. We are like fish that do not even realize that there are hooks in our mouths!

It does not occur to us, or to stockholders, that competent managers are out there who would gladly take top management positions for much, much less. Corporate executives have engineered a coup of sorts, having separated ownership from control at the expense of stockholders and even systemic risk in the financial system. The suits have even captured the government, such that stockholder votes on compensation are legally non-binding. This is not the invisible hand connecting demand and supply in the labor market; rather, it is a result of a rich velvet coup under the subterfuge of capitalism and democracy—with the electorate completely beguiled. Let’s not pretend this is the free market doing this, or that the governments in the U.S. are oriented to protecting the interests of stockholders and the public at the expense of the corporate managerial class.

See Essays on the Financial Crisis.

Sources:

Eric Dash, “The Lucrative Fall from Grace,” New York Times, September 30, 2011. 

Gred Farrell, Crash of the Titans (New York: Crown Business, 2010). On Thain's bonus, see chapter 16.

Executive Compensation (Part I): Systemic Risk

In the wake of the financial crisis, according to the Huffington Post, “a number of the nation's largest banks were excused from the government's rescue program before they had returned to a position of complete financial security -- in part because they wanted to avoid restrictions on how much their executives would get paid, according to a new report from the program's government overseer. Citigroup, Wells Fargo, PNC and Bank of America successfully lobbied to leave the federal bailout program early in 2009, even though the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had recommended they take additional steps to shore up their assets, according to a new report from the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Relief Asset Program, a government watchdog office. Regulators, including the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, eventually ‘relaxed’ their criteria for letting the banks out of the program, the report says, leaving questions about whether the banks had strengthened their holdings enough to be able to withstand another systemic crisis.”[1]

The Huffington Post reports that according to SIGTARP, in 2009, the “four banks repeatedly tried to leave the bailout program, also known as TARP, ahead of schedule, claiming that the stigma attached to the bailout would damage investor confidence in their stability. Bank of America was especially persistent, submitting 11 separate exit proposals to the Federal Reserve Board in less than a month. The banks, particularly Citigroup and Bank of America, also expressed concern that if they stayed in TARP, they would be subject to the program's restrictions on executive compensation.

"Ultimately, the federal banking regulators ended up bowing to pressure" to let the banks leave early, said Christy Romero, Acting Special Inspector General for TARP and the author of the report. Romero added that in the event of another shock, many banks could be left with too little capital to endure, raising the possibility that "it could potentially trigger an avalanche of severe consequences to the broader economy." As a result of the regulators’ lenience, Romero told The Huffington Post, the financial system is still carrying considerable systemic risk from huge, interconnected banks, well after the meltdown of 2008. "The institutions that were 'too big to fail' ... are bigger than they were before," said Romero. "It's very critical that regulators remain vigilant to banks' demands to relax capital requirements."[2]

In short, the U.S. Government and its central bank, the Federal Reserve, acquiesced on bank executive’s desire for more (i.e., greed) at the expense of reducing systemic risk. That the bankers presumed themselves as being in a position to lobby—especially to obviate compensation restrictions —given the roles played by the banks in the mortgage securities crisis, is astounding, as is the obsequious reaction of the regulators. The dynamic itself evinces the U.S. as a plutocracy rather than as representative democracies. Furthermore, the motive of the bankers demonstrates a continued fixation on gain at the expense not only of the system (i.e., systemic risk), but also of stockholders. 

See Essays on the Financial Crisis.

1. Alexander Eichler, “BofA, Wells Fargo, Citigroup Left TARP Early to Avoid Restrictions on Executive Pay,” The Huffington Post, September 30, 2011.

2, Ibid.

CEO Pay: American and European Values

To what extent do inequalities in wealth accrue based on structural elements, such as tax deductions that only wealthy people can use, as distinct from factors pertaining to individuals, such as talent, sacrifice, and effort? The two clusters can build on each other, as people who have become rich primarily by exercising a talent and working hard use some of their accrued power to “reform” the system to their advantage at the expense of the poor and middle class. Such structural reforms in turn can make it easier for wealthy people to become even richer. In the context of a society in progress, structural and idiosyncratic factors doubtlessly interact—the trend being of an increasing chasm between the rich and poor. 

 

 

For example, as the graph above indicates, CEO compensation in the U.S. increased at a higher percentage rate than did corporate profits and factory worker pay every year from 1990 to 2005. In 2010, CEO compensation increased 27% while workers saw their compensation increase just 2.1 percent. Meanwhile, the poverty rate increased from 12% to 14%. CEOs in the E.U. were making comparably less. Foreign Policy in Focus reports that in 2006, for example, “the 20 highest-paid European managers made an average of $12.5 million, only one third as much as the 20 highest-earning U.S. executives. The Europeans earned less, despite leading larger firms.” I suspect that societal values have a lot to do with the difference, though changes in the make-up of American executive compensation should not be ignored.

Specifically, the ratio of pay between an American CEO and factory worker has been increasing in part to the growing proportion of executive compensation in the form of stock options. However, it is also true that Americans are relatively accepting of very high incomes (and inequality). A European is more likely to say, Enough is enough once a CEO has made far more than he or she could ever use. Politically, this is reflected in the fact that the Green Party and the Party of the Left are more powerful (and represented) in Europe than in America. Although the American two-party system acts to cut off the “extremes,” I suspect that the proportion of Americans who would agree with a European far-left party is less than in the E.U.

According to Foreign Policy in Focus, “In the United States, only 32 percent of the public [in 2007 supported] an outright pay cap on executive earnings. But average Americans [appeared] to be every bit as outraged over CEO pay excess as average Europeans. Indeed, 77 percent of Americans [said that] corporate executives "earn too much.” This disconnect, which I submit does not exist in Europe, reflects the American value on economic freedom and the association of freedom with putting up with someone else’s objectionable views or conduct.

In Europe, during and after the recession of 2008, “the idea of raising taxes on high-income earners” gained currency. New E.U. and state taxes were proposed, including a tax on financial transactions (E.U.) and a one-time levy on high-income individuals. In the state of Britain, the tax rate on the highest segment was increased from 40% to 50%, and in the state of Italy the government was considering in 2011 an additional 5% tax on annual incomes above 90,000 euros and a 10% on incomes over 150,000 euros. Considering the increasing fiscal demands being put on the E.U. Government and the pressing debt situations in many states, the recessionary risk of increasing tax on the rich may well be worthwhile. Indeed, Liliane Bettencourt and fifteen other billionaires made an open plea for a special tax on the European rich. Recognizing that they had benefitted financially from the European “structure,” they wanted to help preserve it.

As valuable as closing budget-gaps by revenue and spending reforms at the state and E.U. levels is, the matter of addressing a cycle of increasing economic inequality remains unanswered. If a given societal structure acts as a multiplier effect on a given inequality—exacerbating it, in effect—then something more than a new tax may be needed. In other words, any bias in the system that increases the inequality can be neutralized by the addition of a countervailing structure. For example, placing a strict limit, such as $1 million, on what an individual can inherit—with the rest going back to society via the state—would act to counter the “snowball effect” of “old wealth.” At least as of 2011, a person can live comfortably on $1 million; the surplus, being essentially surfeit with respect to what  person is apt to consume, would be better used as a corrective of the tendency of wealth to further accumulate among the rich. In other words, just as banks with assets over $1 trillion are too big to fail, a billionaire getting richer may not be worth the “cost” to society in terms of the increased inequality—to say nothing of the probable compromise to a republic form of government (which can often be too easily bought).

In short, income and even accumulated wealth can reasonably be considered as applying generally to one’s life (and those of one’s kids and grandchildren) and more particularly to being used (i.e., spent). If one’s wealth vastly exceeds what can be spent on things one can consume, this might be an indication that the concentration has gotten out of hand, at the expense of society itself. In other words, if you have a bank account with a balance of $15 billion, do you really need $5 billion more?  Will you ever use it? There is an opportunity cost—part of which being contributing back to society and reducing the economic inequality. Even so, this way of thinking reflects a value on solidarity that is much more European than American, at least in terms of being valued. In other words, the typical American would be more likely to object to any limitation on economic freedom, even if the playing field is tilted in the direction of the wealthy being able to take disproportionate advantage of that freedom, irrespective of whether the additional wealth is usable.  

Sources:

David Gauthier-Villars, “Wealthy French Push for Extra Tax,” Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2011. 

Matt Krantz and Barbara Hansen, “CEO Pay Sours While Workers’ Pay Stalls,” USA Today, April 4, 2011. 

Sarah Anderson, “Executive Pay Debate Raging in Europe and the United States,” Foreign Policy in Focus, August 28, 2007. 

Company Police-States: United Airlines Attacks a Passenger

A manager of United Airlines boarded on the ground in Chicago to have three security employees of the Chicago Department of Aviation bloody and drag a physician off the plane to make room for an employee not on the flight’s crew. Although the airline was technically within its rights to forcibly remove the man for refusing to give up his seat, which he had paid for, removing paid passengers at the last minute to make room for additional, non-essential staff showed a lack of judgment. Accordingly, the police-power of the company is problematic and should be dialed back.  In fact, the power of the industry, including its companies, may need to be reduced.

 A passenger--a physician--being dragged from his paid, reserved seat as a United manager looks on. (Source: Tyler Bridges)

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.  

Starbucks’ CEO Triggering Conversations on Race

Should a company’s CEO use the vast tentacles of the local retail stores to prompt public discourse on race in America? Even though improving race relations is a good cause, extending a CEO’s personal influence beyond the products societally requires its own justification. For a week in March 2015, baristas at 12,000 Starbucks coffee shops implemented CEO Howard Schultz’s intent to “spark customer conversation on the topic of race.”[1] Schultz even made a video in which he told the baristas how they should steer their respective conversations. If this sounds a bit like George Orwell’s Big Brother in the novel, 1984, the question may be whether such societal influence is legitimate from a position of management in business.

Perhaps Shultz ought to devote some time to figuring out some better places for electric outlets in the stores. The middle-underside of a long table is not so good on knees. Put another way, if the management can't get something as simple as that right, what makes them think they can manage conversations on a controversial issue? 

The complete essay is at "Under Starbucks' Star."

A Conflict-of-Interest in Lobbying: The Case of JPMorgan

At the JP Morgan stockholder meeting on May 15, 2012, as the FBI was opening an investigation into the bank’s $2 (or $3 )billion loss on credit derivatives, Chair/CEO Jamie Dimon gave what the Huffington Post calls “a spirited defense of the bank’s efforts to lobby against stiffer financial regulation.” He argued that the bank’s interest is the same as the stockholders—namely, to make the financial system strong and sound. What he omitted was the part about the bank’s interest including its own profit, even if systemic risk of the system is increased as a result. In general, any business looks primary after its own interests, and only then to the general interests of the system.

The full essay is at "JPMorgan: An Unethical Monstrosity," available at Amazon. 

Holding the Unfit Accountable vs. Murdoch’s Entitlement to Power

“A damning report [in late April 2012] on the hacking scandal at Rupert Murdoch’s British newspapers concluding that Mr. Murdoch is “not a fit person” to run a huge international company has convulsed Britain’s political and media worlds and threatened a core asset of Mr. Murdoch’s American-based News Corporation.”[1] The report also “found that three senior Murdoch executives misled Parliament in testimony” and “alleges that the company sought to cover up widespread phone hacking.”[2]

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. John F. Burns and Ravi Somaiya, “Panel in Hacking Case Finds Murdoch Unfit as News Titan,” The New York Times, May 1, 2012

2. Ibid.

Batting Better Than Goldman Sachs on Corporate Governance

Companies differ on how they handle personal and institutional conflicts of interest. This difference may reflect disagreement over whether a conflict of interest is inherently unethical, or whether one must be exploited for any conduct to be unethical. I take the former position: that to be in a conflict of interest is indeed inherently unethical. At the very least, being in a conflict of interest can trigger or spawn additional conflicts of interest. I point to Goldman Sachs’ response to an institutional stockholder’s corporate governance proposal as a case in point. That case can be contrasted with how the BATs board reacted in terms of corporate governance to bad public relations and a failed IPO.


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Batting Better Than Goldman Sachs on Corporate Governance

Companies differ on how they handle personal and institutional conflicts of interest. This difference may reflect disagreement over whether a conflict of interest is inherently unethical, or whether one must be exploited for any conduct to be unethical. I take the former position: that to be in a conflict of interest is indeed inherently unethical. At the very least, being in a conflict of interest can trigger or spawn additional conflicts of interest. I point to Goldman Sachs’ response to an institutional stockholder’s corporate governance proposal as a case in point. That case can be contrasted with how the BATs board reacted in terms of corporate governance to bad public relations and a failed IPO.


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.