Pope Francis: Religious and Secular Arguments for Governments Subordinating Markets to Social Norms

The documentary, Pope Francis: A Man of His Word (2018) chiefly lays out the pope’s critique of economic Man. The film begins with references to climate change too loosely linked to the global population figure of 8 million humans, 1 billion of whom are unnecessarily living in poverty. The viewer is left to fill in the gaps, such as that because as biological organisms we must consume and use energy, the hyperextended overpopulation of the species is the root cause of climate- and ecosystem-changing CO2 in the atmosphere and oceans. Arguably, the salvific Son of God or the means into the Kingdom of God enjoy pride of place in the gospels, but compassion for the poor as well as outcasts and the sick is indeed a message that Jesus stresses in the faith narratives. Rather than being a sign of sin, poverty, especially if voluntary,  can permit the sort of humility that is much superior to the pride of the Pharisees. In the documentary, Jorge Bergoglio, who took the name Francis in becoming pope of the Roman Catholic Church in 2013, is a practical man who points to the sickness or temptation of greed that keeps humanity from riding itself of poverty, unnecessarily. Moreover, the hegemony of the market, with its culture of consumerism and commoditization, comes at the cost of the common good, which to Francis has a spiritual basis. Abstractly speaking, harmony, which inherently respects its own limitations, should have priority over greed and markets. Both of these can go to excess without enough built-in constraints as occurred before and during the financial crisis of 2008, with poverty plaguing humanity more rather than less as a result.

The full essay is at "Pope Francis."

Tension between Wall Street and Main Street: A Case beyond the Reach of Corporate Social Responsibility

In October 2011, Gerald Seib wrote that political and economic pressures in the wake of the financial crisis were “pushing business leaders into the public cross hairs.”[1] I submit that the very existence of the largest American banks was becoming an issue. In such a case in which a gulf between business and society is so fundamental or deep, corporate social responsibility programs do not suffice and may even backfire. While it is normal for the norms and values of a business sector to differ from those of the wider whole (i.e., society), it is uncommon for a rupture to be so deep that corporate marketing and CSR are not sufficient business responses. I submit that in such cases and where corporations have a lot of power over government officials, CEOs extend their toolset to government to fill in the trench. The "Occupy Wall Street" protests is a case in point. 

From the corporate standpoint, the time was ripe for the field of business and society, whose topics include corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship, and stakeholder management. The fundamental matter to be “managed,” or assuaged, in that field of business concerns divergent norms as well as values between the individual corporations or the business sector and the wider society. Tension is not always or invariably present, but the fact that a corporation and even the business sector is a part of a wider whole (i.e., a society) suggests that the respective interests, perspectives, norms, and values are likely to differ. Generally speaking, the interests of a part are not identical to the interests of the whole of which the part is a subunit or part. An externality such as from dumping chemicals in a river or polluting the air means that a company's interest, norms, and values can differ from those of a society. 

Self-interest can obviously affect norms and values. A powerful corporation's executives and board may believe that the company's power over members of the U.S. Congress is normal and right because such dominance is in the corporation's financial interest. Meanwhile, voters may feel that such a distended dominance by the moneyed interest harms democracy and is thus a norm that should not exist. 

According to Seib, societal populists and corporate executives were not on the same page in 2011. In as much as the executives were utilizing corporate social responsibility to create the impression that the corporate norms and values being espoused were in line with societal norms and values, the field of business and society may not have been equipped to deal with divergent talking points that are grounded in antipodal, or antithetical, social realities. In short, corporate social responsibility as marketing or "window-dressing" can be detected as fake, thereby increasing the rift rather than reducing it. Indeed, it can be said that the topic began as an ideal  to bridge the gap between corporations and societies only to end up in marketing.[2] Foisting the illusion of convergent corporate and societal values can backfire by illuminating boardrooms as places where only a narrow perspective of short-term profit pervades.

In the context of the “Occupy Wall Street” protests spreading across the U.S. during the Fall of 2011, Seib pointed to the existence of “a radical disconnect between the picture populist critics paint from the outside, and the one business leaders describe from inside.”[3] This disconnect had gone back to September 2008, when bankers viewed the collapse of the housing market (and those of related financial products, such as CDOs) as a result of over-reaching, dishonest and languid mortgage borrowers. 

Meanwhile, the wider society saw greedy and fraudulent mortgage originators and investment bankers behind the adjustable-arm steep mortgages and the "crap" bonds that were based on those risky mortgages. This disconnect infuriated the general public, especially because contrition would not come from Wall Street. Greed refuses any constraint, including even acknowledging even some responsibility. Banks would engage in mass foreclosures without a hint of guilt for having misled people into going for oversized houses. The mortgage producers at Countrywide and other companies conveniently made the bad assumption that a few years of mortgage payments would enable the mortgage borrowers to shift from step-wise increasing-rate to fixed 20-year mortgages so as to avoid the higher interest payments. This flawed assumption was no doubt helped out by the fact that more mortgages would be sold, and thus higher bonues received. The interest of the economy, not to mention society as a whole, was of lesser concern. Hence the clash in norms and values between the part and the whole. 

In the populist protests, the crowd also saw American companies with enough profit and cash to create jobs domestically yet without the will to do so. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, American corporations had cut their work forces in the U.S. by nearly 3 million, while increasing employment abroad by almost 2.5 million. In the fall of 2011, Standard & Poor predicted corporate earnings growth of 13.5% for the third quarter, which, according to Seib, suggested “to Wall Street protesters that companies were hoarding profits without creating work.”[3] Saving money by moving factories "off shore" fits the business value of efficiency, and even the maxim in trade that goods should be produced where doing so is cheapest (e.g., where the goods are most plentiful). The cost of such a norm of and value on going abroad is externalized to the host country, which is left with the impaired social contract between a large corporation and the society. 

Generally speaking, a government says, in effect, to a company: We'll let you incorporate and even expand into multinational corporations but we expect you to provide jobs in addition to benefiting your customers with goods and services. This version of the social contract that includes the obligation to provide as many jobs as possible (i.e., while still allowing for a reasonable profit, and thus dividends) is controversial, however, because CEOs could retort that providing goods and services that reduce suffering and increase happiness is sufficient. From a utilitarian standpoint, therefore, such CEO's could even claim an ethical justification. Such a justification would likely merely be marketing to craw back some of the lost reputational capital, a long-term intangible asset. 

According to Seib, business leaders cited more practical factors that more easily fit into the traditional business calculus. From the business perspective, third-quarter expectations were less than expected. The managers pointed to the benefits of an artificially weak dollar that had already strengthened at the expense of exports. More broadly, businesses were looking at weak consumer demand and increasing costs with government regulations, which make augmenting the domestic work force more costly. Seib juxtaposes this business view of a hostile business environment with the societal view that looked angrily at unpatriotic and greedy corporate chieftains. 

I submit that when a divide is so gaping, depating the factors in the business environment doesn't fit. Corporate social responsibility programs, such as having employees volunteer at soup kitchens, are not restorative. Firstly, the benefit from such programs would not come close to the original costs borne by society from the reckless and even fraudulent banking practices. Secondly, the people hurt from those practices are not necessarily helped by a program. This is especially true if the "restorative" program in oriented to another society problem, such a disease. Thirdly, corporations benefit from the good public relations from a CSR program. An angry populist is not likely to be pleased that one of the selfish, reckless banks is actually benefiting as it makes contrition. Fourthly, the gap between the business sector (or an industry, but not likely an individual company) and a society can be so deep enough that capitalism itself is severely questioned at large. Filling in such a deep trench goes beyond what CSR can do; a bulldozer rather than some shovels are needed in such cases. I contend that the "Occupy Wall Street" protests that took place three years after the financial crisis deepened or perhaps only exposed such a trench. I suspect this is why the U.S. Government, which was refusing to hold mortgage producers and investment bankers criminally accountable for the fraud--protecting the powerful financial sector--took an active role in stopping the protests. To have the very legitimacy of corporate America, or even just the banking sector, even questioned in such a public way was likely too much for a government whose elected officials could receive unlimited campaign contributions. 

1. Gerald F. Seib, “Populist Anger Over Economy Carries Risks for Big Business,” The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2011. More generally, see Skip Worden, Essays on the Financial Crisis.

2. William C. Frederick, my doctoral professor in the field of Business & Society, came to this conclusion, as did I. When upon retirement from teaching he turned to the application of the natural sciences to economizing and power-aggrandizement in relation to societal "ecologizing" forces, and then to management, I truly became one of his students (for twenty years). I gave a conference paper, for example, on how a company could be run on ecologizing rather than profit-maximizing principles. The field of Business & Society is indeed wider and more abstract than the CSR topic. 

3. Seib, “Populist Anger Over Economy Carries Risks for Big Business.”

God's Gold on Wall St.: A Vaunted Self-Assessment of God's Work

A year after the financial crisis of 2008, Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO of Goldman Sachs,  found himself vilified for his firm’s quick return to risky trading in spite of its new bank holding company status. Populist resentment at the time was especially pitted against the hefty bonuses from the trades. Also, people were upset about the benefits that the bank had obtained from the decisions of its alums in the U.S. Government—specifically, in the U.S. Department of the Treatury. For instance, Goldman Sachs and other AIG counterparties got a the dollar-for-dollar payout from AIG thanks to an infusion of funds for that specific purpose by Treasury. Regardless, in an interview with the London Times, the highest-paid CEO (at least in the financial sector) dismissed such talk and defended his money-making machine and its compensation.  In addition to being the engine of economic recovery, according to Blankfein, Goldman Sachs provides a social function in making capital available to companies so they can expand. Stunningly, he adds, “I’m doing God’s work.”[1]  Such a claim is a far cry indeed from Thomas Jefferson’s warning that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies.[2]  Perhaps God intends to undo our liberties by bailing out the banks.

Besides these rather obvious problems with Blankfein's religious claim is his presumption to know what God's work is, and, furthermore, that he is doing it.   Even though a feckless system of corporate governance can enable a CEO to essentially function as his or her own boss, including doing the board's job of evaluating his or her own performance, it is a tall order for a human being to be able to evaluate his performance as God's work.   To be sure, it is possible that God is an intelligent being that bestows favor on his golden stewards for doing His work.

Lloyd Blankfein may have been involved in two conflicts of interest: 1) that of having excessive power over the board whose principal task it is to oversee him, 2) having communicated with GS alums in high posts in the U.S. Government (e.g., Hank Paulson) and perhaps having them enact policies on GS's behalf.   It may be that institutional and personal conflicts of interests can become so ubiquitous that they are simply not seen by the culprits. Furthermore, it could be that the denial enabled by a tacit presumptuousness is like a white movie screen on which even doing God's work can be projected. How ironic it is, that sordid proprietary interest could operate not merely under the subterfuge of being a neutral "market-maker," but also as God's work. Such work is two degrees of freedom away from squalid greed. So it is remarkable that the two could become conflated in a mind.

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[1] John Arlidge, I’m doing ‘God’s work. Meet Mr. Goldman Sachs, The Sunday Times, 11/9/09.

[2] Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, Monticello, May 28, 1816, in Paul L. Ford, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1892-99),  XI, 533.

See related book: God's Gold and Essays on the Financial Crisis

BP: Dividends to Stockholders Despite a Sordid Safety Record

As BP was wrestling with stopping the oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico and cleaning up the oil, a controversy broke out between the company’s stockholders and the  US Government on whether any dividends should be declared and paid before the company has taken care of the Gulf.  BP earned more than $16 billion in 2009. Based on higher oil prices, in the first quarter of 2010 the company’s profit more than doubled to $6.08 billion from $2.56 billion  in the first quarter of 2010.  BP’s dividend payment accounted for about £1 of every £8 handed out by British companies in 2009. Given the higher profit in the first quarter of 2010, stockholders were expecting more in dividends.

The question was how much the company’s costs in regard to the Gulf would or should cut into the dividends; the political question was whether any surplus wealth should be paid to investors before the company’s legal and moral obligations were taken care of in the Gulf region.  Although not suggesting that their company was not obligated to stop the rupsure and fund the clean up, BP officials claimed that their company had already paid in other ways.

Already by mid June, 2010, BP shares had fallen more than 40 percent since the fatal explosion at the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in April, wiping more than £50 billion, or $73 billion, from the company’s market value. The drop came after lawmakers in Washington called on BP to suspend its dividend and advertising campaign to pay for the cleanup, and a senior official said the Justice Department was “planning to take action.” Most shareholders rejected concerns that the costs of a cleanup and possible damages could force BP into Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and said the drop in the share price is not justified by the value of BP’s assets.  BP officials indicated the company’s executives would decide in July whether to keep the quarterly dividend at 14 cents a share for the second quarter. In 2009, the company paid about $10.5 billion in dividends.

By June 10 2010, the company’s cost in regard to the oil spill had reached about $1.43 billion. A BP official said it was “too earlier to quantify other potential costs and liabilities associated with the incident.”  Earlier in June, BP officials told investors that the company had $5 billion cash on hand and that it was generating “significant additional cash flow” as the price of oil remained above $60 a barrel. BP had 18 billion barrels of proved reserves and 63 billion barrels of resources at the end of 2009 that it could draw on.

Iain Armstrong, an analyst at investment manager Brewin Dolphin in London agreed with BP that the company had enough money to pay for the cleanup efforts and also rejected any potential concern that the company might not be able to pay for its debt. “It’s gotten completely out of hand,” Mr. Armstrong said. “It’s a totally overpoliticized situation. There is a disconnect between reality and BP being totally lambasted… . Ironically, by being extremely strong financially, BP has become a target here,” he said. I contend, however, that BP became a target because of its atrocious safety record and its culpability at Deepwater Horizon.

BP falsified regulatory documents by indicating that there was zero percent risk of an off-shore rig accident creating a rupsure and that the company had the technology to stop and clean up such a problem.  Tony Hayward admitted after the explosion that BP lacked the “tools you would want in your tool kit” to close a blown deep-water well.  In other words, the earlier claim to have had the technology was a lie (which MMS never bothered to disconver, as the agency had been captured).  Lest it be said that no group of people is perfect, BP’s history attests to justifiable blame.

In 2005, a blowdown drum overfilled with liquid hydrocarbons at BP’s Texas City refinery killed 15 and wounded 170.  BP was cited for old equipment, overworked and unsupervised employees and contractors, and managerial inattention to safety. The US Chemical Safety Board put the cause as “organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels.”  Meanwhile, a shoddy ballast system was found at BP’s offshore platform Thunder Horse.  In 2006, a corroded pipeline in BP’s Purdhoe Bay field in Alaska leaked thousands of barrels. In the following year, Tony Hayward became the CEO. He promised to make safety his priority. Yet in 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration fined BP a record $87.4 million for more than 700 safety violations at the Texas City refinery. Nonetheless, David Nicholas, a BP spokesman, wrote, “Safe, reliable operations have been and continue to be our number one priority.”  Not only has this not been the case, BP managers (and lawyers) have been more interested in minimizing liability than being responsible for the consequences of the lapses.

At Deepwater Horizon, when an employee discovered that one pod of the blow-out preventer was leaking, a manager simply shut it down and used the other pod (rather than fixing the leak). Another worker found such low hydrolic pressure in the device that he knew it was time to leave.  In Congressional testimony, Tony Hayward said BP regarded the equipment as the fail-safe mechanism, even as blow-out preventers in general have a 44% failure rate and the device at Deepwater Horizon was known to have a broken pod. Furthermore, after the well fire, the company low-balled the estimated volume of oil going into the Gulf in order to minimize its future liability.  During the first week after the explosion, the company’s estimate was 1000 barrels per day.  During the second week, the company estimated 5000.  Meanwhile, company documents show an estimate of 100,000 per day as a worse-case scenerio. That the wider society would not be sufficiently informed of the magnitude of the clean-up required did not seem to bother the managers at BP, whose concern was mainly to minimize the company’s liability (and thus maximize their stockholders dividends).  Selfishness among the culpable is telling. At the very least, responsibility can be defined as paying for the harm consequent to one’s mistake.  Satisfying such responsibility has priority over dividends, which are residual, after all. In making the protection of dividends (and the stock price) a priority, BP’s managers evinced a reversal of priorities that was ahistoric for the modern corporation.

It is for these reasons, not because BP is a giant corporation or is British, that BP was the target of such scathing rebuke by the American public and the American governments. Mr. Armstrong said that President Obama should not forget that 40 percent of BP shares are owned by United States shareholders. “So he’s not doing them any favors either,” he said. Again, I beg to differ. Acting in the public interest, Barak Obama is doing us all a favor.  Of course, the politics of this matter were no doubt different in Europe.

London’s mayor, Boris Johnson, said Thursday that the drop in BP’s shares was slowly becoming a political issue in Britain. “When you consider the huge exposure of British pension funds to BP and the BP share price and the vital importance of BP then I do think it starts to become a matter of national concern if a great British company is being continually beaten up on international airwaves,” he told BBC Radio on June 10th. However, Reuters quoted Prime Minister David Cameron as saying, “This is an environmental catastrophe. BP needs to do everything it can to deal with the situation, and the U.K. government stands ready to help. I completely understand the U.S. government’s frustration.”

In a general sense, the governments are relatively oriented to the public interest, whereas BP, as a private corporation, has a fiduciary obligation to its stockholders.  Robert Reich referred to this obligation as a company’s “corporate social responsibility” on the Countdown with Keith Obermann show on MSNBC on June 14, 2010.  “Social” can admittedly be in reference to stockholders’ social concerns (though “social concerns” is rather vague); however, the term can also refer to society, which is larger than any group of stockholders. To BP’s management, it makes perfect sense in terms of corporate governance to declare and pay dividends as long as the company has enough resources to cover its actual and contingent liabilities related to the gulf.  Considering the billions that the company has in oil reserves, it could satisfy both. In an economic sense, the dichotomy may not make sense.  However, politically, there is resistance to the declaration and payment of dividends, and this “irrational” element is ignored by BP to its economic peril.  Essentially, the political reaction is challenging the right of the company to continue to exist. At the very least, the objection is that the company should not be run as normal.  In other words, the political claim is ultimately that BP has broken the social contract that legitimates its right to conduct business within the US.

Lest we have become too ahistoric, it might be worth our while to study the history of the modern corporation.  Originally, the modern joint-holding company was delegated a function to do for the public by a government.  If the company had enough left over after performing the function, it could give the surplus to the stockholders.  Through the twentieth century, the interests of the stockholders became increasingly central, eclipsing even the “delegated public function” aspect of the charters.  Essentially, a society gives a group of people permission to do a function. This implies that doing the function, and taking care of any adverse consequences caused by the company, are primary.  The political demand of the American governments is that dividends not be declared or paid until BP has rectified the Gulf region as required by law, societal norms, and ethical standards. From the standpoint of BP having been granted permission to operate in the US (leaving aside the billions in contracts from the US Government), the demand is not so much the product of irrational exuberance.

In effect, BP’s managers ignored systemic risk.  In being the closest we have to anyone able to solve the problem, BP is too big to fail. Managers at the company lied about being able to handle a major rupture. The MMS regulatory agency went along, having been coopted by the industry it was to regulate.  This is a failure of business as well as government.  All the emphasis on BP taking orders from the US Government in the wake of the rupture can be interpreted as “reaction formation” given the powerlessness felt in government having been so dominated by private interests ahistorically oriented to their stock price.  If the Gulf of Mexico seemed broken, this condition could be read as a symptom of a political-economic rupture.  I suspect that big business has gotten too big—taking too big risks, capturing governments, and acting with impunity.  As if the financial crisis of 2008 was not enough of a warning call, the oil spill of 2010 depicts too big to fail in very concrete terms.  Whether governments have sufficient power to reassume the driver’s seat in delegating public functions to private commercial associations depends on whether legislators have enough backbone to limit the size and wealth of big business.

Sources: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/business/11bp.html?hp
Countdown with Keith Obermann, MSNBC TV, June 21, 2010; Byran Walsh, “The Spreading Stain,” Time (June 21, 2010), pp. 51-59.


Related material is in Cases of Unethical Business, which is available at Amazon.

Executive Compensation (Part I): Systemic Risk

In the wake of the financial crisis, according to the Huffington Post, “a number of the nation's largest banks were excused from the government's rescue program before they had returned to a position of complete financial security -- in part because they wanted to avoid restrictions on how much their executives would get paid, according to a new report from the program's government overseer. Citigroup, Wells Fargo, PNC and Bank of America successfully lobbied to leave the federal bailout program early in 2009, even though the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had recommended they take additional steps to shore up their assets, according to a new report from the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Relief Asset Program, a government watchdog office. Regulators, including the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, eventually ‘relaxed’ their criteria for letting the banks out of the program, the report says, leaving questions about whether the banks had strengthened their holdings enough to be able to withstand another systemic crisis.”[1]

The Huffington Post reports that according to SIGTARP, in 2009, the “four banks repeatedly tried to leave the bailout program, also known as TARP, ahead of schedule, claiming that the stigma attached to the bailout would damage investor confidence in their stability. Bank of America was especially persistent, submitting 11 separate exit proposals to the Federal Reserve Board in less than a month. The banks, particularly Citigroup and Bank of America, also expressed concern that if they stayed in TARP, they would be subject to the program's restrictions on executive compensation.

"Ultimately, the federal banking regulators ended up bowing to pressure" to let the banks leave early, said Christy Romero, Acting Special Inspector General for TARP and the author of the report. Romero added that in the event of another shock, many banks could be left with too little capital to endure, raising the possibility that "it could potentially trigger an avalanche of severe consequences to the broader economy." As a result of the regulators’ lenience, Romero told The Huffington Post, the financial system is still carrying considerable systemic risk from huge, interconnected banks, well after the meltdown of 2008. "The institutions that were 'too big to fail' ... are bigger than they were before," said Romero. "It's very critical that regulators remain vigilant to banks' demands to relax capital requirements."[2]

In short, the U.S. Government and its central bank, the Federal Reserve, acquiesced on bank executive’s desire for more (i.e., greed) at the expense of reducing systemic risk. That the bankers presumed themselves as being in a position to lobby—especially to obviate compensation restrictions —given the roles played by the banks in the mortgage securities crisis, is astounding, as is the obsequious reaction of the regulators. The dynamic itself evinces the U.S. as a plutocracy rather than as representative democracies. Furthermore, the motive of the bankers demonstrates a continued fixation on gain at the expense not only of the system (i.e., systemic risk), but also of stockholders. 

See Essays on the Financial Crisis.

1. Alexander Eichler, “BofA, Wells Fargo, Citigroup Left TARP Early to Avoid Restrictions on Executive Pay,” The Huffington Post, September 30, 2011.

2, Ibid.

Deficiencies in the E.U. Capital Markets: A Silver Lining

With the IMF reducing its forecast of E.U.[1] economic growth for 2015 by 0.2% to 1.2 percent, E.C.B. officials still intent to go ahead with the much-anticipated “quantitative easing” program (i.e., buying state bonds), and, the euro having recently fallen 12% against the U.S. dollar since peaking, and crude oil prices below $60 a barrel in January, the limited scale of the E.U.’s capital markets relative to their American counterparts exacerbated the E.U.’s blight. Most directly, the lack of diversification on the types of capital markets meant that the focus on the bonds issued by state governments would continue.[2] With an upcoming election in the state of Greece making stock markets jittery due to the risk that the state might default on its bonds, the precarious condition of a relatively undiversified capital market added, albeit subtly, to the sense of risk in the air. Having had years to develop alternative markets since the financial crisis, E.U. policy makers had no one to blame but themselves—it would seem. However, a bright spot in European culture or society may be responsible for the lack of development.

The size of the corporate bond market was at the time just 34% of the American counterpart as a proportion of GDP, according to New Financial, a think tank in London.[3] The E.U.’s leveraged loan and securitization markets were 19% and 17% the size of their U.S. counterparts, and the venture capital market was just 15 percent, again all in terms relative to GDP.[4] Because the respective U.S. counterparts dwarf the E.U. markets by such an amazing extent in terms of GDP, part of the explanation may involve different business cultures with respect to debt.

With the U.S. federal debt at nearly $18 trillion and the previous year still showing a deficit of over $400 billion, and almost a third of student loans in default, it is easy to view Europeans as relatively debt-averse even if the post-financial-crisis years of debt-weary states (i.e, the “PIGS”) present an image to the contrary. I suspect that the relative skepticism on debt is in turn a manifestation of European society being less infatuated with business and thus less reflective of its culture. Put another way, the positive connotation that leverage (i.e., using borrowing in productive investment to hopefully capture more of the returns than is possible in the case of stock-issuance capital financing) has in the business world has been more salient in American society than in its European counterpart. Considering the misuse of debt-financing in the American and European housing markets that led to the financial crisis in 2008, the relative size of the European capital markets as of 2015 has a silver lining.

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[1] Specifically, for the part of the E.U. that uses the euro currency.

[2] Simon Nixon, “A Continent in Need of Greater Capital Markets,” The Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2015.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

Conflicts of Interest at the Federal Reserve

In 2011, “(m)ore than a dozen members of the regional Federal Reserve boards have had ties to banks or companies that received emergency funds during the [2008 financial] crisis, according to [a GAO report]. The report highlights a close relationship between the Fed's regional banks and many of the institutions they were lending to, adding credence to concerns that the financial sector enjoyed a largely consequence-free rescue in the wake of the crisis, thanks to its connections with the federal government.”[1] Meanwhile, mortgage borrowers with houses “under water” got hammered. From the crisis to the release of the GAO report in October 2011, there were millions foreclosures in the United States, with very little in the way of mortgage modifications or refinancing for those homeowners who needed relief. In other words, the bankers had connections in the banking regulatory agency while Congress left the troubled homeowners—constituents—at the mercy of the bankers. Their agency having their backs, the bankers could afford to take a hard line on the mortgages. The playing field, in other words, is not at all level. 


Material from this essay has been incorporated into "The Federal Reserve" in  Institutional Conflicts of Interest, which is available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.  

1. Alexander Eichler, “Conflicts of Interest Abound at the Federal Reserve, Report Finds,” The Huffington Post, October 19, 2011.

Business Ethics in the Business World: A Glimpse from Goldman Sachs

Goldman Sachs’ ethics code reads in part, “[We] expect our people to maintain high ethical standards in everything they do. . . . From time to time, the firm may waive certain provisions of this Code.”[1]  The explicit conditionality is notable and significant. I contend that among other reasons, a negative impact on the bank’s financial position and/or profits is apt to trigger such a waiver not only at Goldman Sachs, but from the business standpoint more generally.


The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available at Amazon.com.

1. William D. Cohan, Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came toRule the World (NY: Doubleday, 2011).