Goodwill Dismisses a Solid Societal Norm: A Mentality beyond Unethical Conduct

When managers of a business or non-profit interact with a societal norm by openly rejecting any obligation to act in accord with the norm, the reaction from stakeholders can be utter disbelief. The refusal to act in accordance with the norm as it impacts the organization can be beyond bad management and even unethical conduct. The refusal to acknowledge a societal norm even as its impact on the business and stakeholders has been arranged by the business is beyond, though it can include, unethical conduct. Norms are not in themselves ethical, for as David Hume wrote, you can’t get an ought from an is; rational justification by ethical principles must be added before we can get to, “You ought to do X” from “X is the practice.” Yet ethical principles can be in norms, in which case we can say, “You ought to act in accordance with the norm because it is ethical.” In some cases, the norm-business relationship (i.e., Business and Society) can be more salient than an ethical principle in the norm itself. A managerial practice at Goodwill, a non-profit retailer based on donations for the poor, serves as a case in point.

Goodwill stores have tags of several colors on the merchandise. During yellow tag week, merchandise with a yellow tag is half off. Every other Saturday, all of the colors are half off. By the time the doors open, customers have likely formed a long line out in front. Such lines can cover most of the front length of a store. On one such morning at one store, I saw a customer stand by the front doors opposite of the line just five minutes before the opening. I saw the store manager let that customer in second, even though it was obvious that she was not in line. Curious, I entered the store to interview that manager. He told me that his responsibility is only to open the doors, not to determine that some people can come in and others cannot. His lapse would have been easily fixed not by telling the woman, who did not evidently think that store lines applied to her, that she could not enter the store, but, rather, that she would have to go to the back of the line. I asked the manager whether he believed that the line did not pertain to his store. “It is not on our property,” he answered. “We can’t say what people can do out there.” Observing my facial expression, he said he would make sure that customers come in first who are in line, and he even made an announcement lightly chastising “the individuals” who had not waited in line.

Nevertheless, later the same day, I returned to the store to interview two of the associate store managers, both of whom also touted the property point. “So if I come here just before 9am in two weeks, I don’t have to stand in line; I could go second or third?” I asked. “Yes,” one of the associate managers said, even as her hesitation in answering came, I suspect, from a recognition that her answer violates the ethical principle of fairness. This recognition should have given her the sense that something was wrong with the policy she was supporting.

Even though the violation of justice as fairness—it is just that people enter a building in order hence via making a line—is salient in this case, the fact that managers of a store disassociated it from the line to get into the store, hence pertaining directly to the store, is even more bizarre and thus significant. The societal norm here is that customers forming a line outside a store before doors open are to be let in first. For a manager to open a store door and assume that the norm does not apply to his store, and thus does not form an obligation on his part to see that the customers in line go in first, removes him, in effect, from the society or environment in which the store functions.

Even the narrow property-limits rationale is bizarre, for Goodwill leased rather than bought the land and building, and the line of customers pertained to the store even though it did not extend to the sidewalk in front between the building and the parking lot. That the line pertained exclusively to getting into the store overrides the question of property in terms of the incurrence of an obligation because the customers in line had the societal expectation of being able to enter the store in order whether or not the sidewalk was owned by Goodwill. The managers with whom I spoke dismissed the customer’s expectation, whose legitimacy is societal (a societal norm) rather than company-based. The sheer dismissiveness is rude, not to mention bad customer service. Even though the ethical principle of fairness is in the societal norm, the bad attitude toward the customers, the lazy approach to opening the store’s front door, and the decision that the societal norm does not apply to that store are not necessarily unethical (or at least an ethical argument would need to be made).

Narrow self-interest, which business managers tend to adopt, is not in itself unethical. For one thing, the business and financial systems have infrastructures and norms that virtually necessitate it at the firm level. Even so, if stakeholders (or others) are harmed as a consequence, then the narrowness is culpable ethically. In this case study, the harm to the customers in line from one person entering second from opposite the line is small. Few of the customers in line could even see the interloper, and none of the customers—in line or afterward—would have guessed that the store manager’s initial position (and those of two of his associate managers) regarding the store’s responsibility to let the people in line in first.

In fact, that the associate manager who answered affirmatively that I would not need to stand in line (because Goodwill is only concerned, by right, with what goes on inside the stores) had come to such a nonsensical conclusion (and stood behind it) is not in itself unethical. She was not lying, for instance; she really believed herself. Moreover, that a person could believe anything so nonsensical (including the property argument) is also not unethical. Perhaps in the field of business and society, psychology figures in more than does even ethics. Of course, the norms-based field of business and society is (or ought to be!) distinct from business ethics even though the two relate, such as in there being an ethical principle (e.g., fairness) in a societal norm that is not in itself ethical because it merely is.

CEO Pay: American and European Values

To what extent do inequalities in wealth accrue based on structural elements, such as tax deductions that only wealthy people can use, as distinct from factors pertaining to individuals, such as talent, sacrifice, and effort? The two clusters can build on each other, as people who have become rich primarily by exercising a talent and working hard use some of their accrued power to “reform” the system to their advantage at the expense of the poor and middle class. Such structural reforms in turn can make it easier for wealthy people to become even richer. In the context of a society in progress, structural and idiosyncratic factors doubtlessly interact—the trend being of an increasing chasm between the rich and poor. 

 

 

For example, as the graph above indicates, CEO compensation in the U.S. increased at a higher percentage rate than did corporate profits and factory worker pay every year from 1990 to 2005. In 2010, CEO compensation increased 27% while workers saw their compensation increase just 2.1 percent. Meanwhile, the poverty rate increased from 12% to 14%. CEOs in the E.U. were making comparably less. Foreign Policy in Focus reports that in 2006, for example, “the 20 highest-paid European managers made an average of $12.5 million, only one third as much as the 20 highest-earning U.S. executives. The Europeans earned less, despite leading larger firms.” I suspect that societal values have a lot to do with the difference, though changes in the make-up of American executive compensation should not be ignored.

Specifically, the ratio of pay between an American CEO and factory worker has been increasing in part to the growing proportion of executive compensation in the form of stock options. However, it is also true that Americans are relatively accepting of very high incomes (and inequality). A European is more likely to say, Enough is enough once a CEO has made far more than he or she could ever use. Politically, this is reflected in the fact that the Green Party and the Party of the Left are more powerful (and represented) in Europe than in America. Although the American two-party system acts to cut off the “extremes,” I suspect that the proportion of Americans who would agree with a European far-left party is less than in the E.U.

According to Foreign Policy in Focus, “In the United States, only 32 percent of the public [in 2007 supported] an outright pay cap on executive earnings. But average Americans [appeared] to be every bit as outraged over CEO pay excess as average Europeans. Indeed, 77 percent of Americans [said that] corporate executives "earn too much.” This disconnect, which I submit does not exist in Europe, reflects the American value on economic freedom and the association of freedom with putting up with someone else’s objectionable views or conduct.

In Europe, during and after the recession of 2008, “the idea of raising taxes on high-income earners” gained currency. New E.U. and state taxes were proposed, including a tax on financial transactions (E.U.) and a one-time levy on high-income individuals. In the state of Britain, the tax rate on the highest segment was increased from 40% to 50%, and in the state of Italy the government was considering in 2011 an additional 5% tax on annual incomes above 90,000 euros and a 10% on incomes over 150,000 euros. Considering the increasing fiscal demands being put on the E.U. Government and the pressing debt situations in many states, the recessionary risk of increasing tax on the rich may well be worthwhile. Indeed, Liliane Bettencourt and fifteen other billionaires made an open plea for a special tax on the European rich. Recognizing that they had benefitted financially from the European “structure,” they wanted to help preserve it.

As valuable as closing budget-gaps by revenue and spending reforms at the state and E.U. levels is, the matter of addressing a cycle of increasing economic inequality remains unanswered. If a given societal structure acts as a multiplier effect on a given inequality—exacerbating it, in effect—then something more than a new tax may be needed. In other words, any bias in the system that increases the inequality can be neutralized by the addition of a countervailing structure. For example, placing a strict limit, such as $1 million, on what an individual can inherit—with the rest going back to society via the state—would act to counter the “snowball effect” of “old wealth.” At least as of 2011, a person can live comfortably on $1 million; the surplus, being essentially surfeit with respect to what  person is apt to consume, would be better used as a corrective of the tendency of wealth to further accumulate among the rich. In other words, just as banks with assets over $1 trillion are too big to fail, a billionaire getting richer may not be worth the “cost” to society in terms of the increased inequality—to say nothing of the probable compromise to a republic form of government (which can often be too easily bought).

In short, income and even accumulated wealth can reasonably be considered as applying generally to one’s life (and those of one’s kids and grandchildren) and more particularly to being used (i.e., spent). If one’s wealth vastly exceeds what can be spent on things one can consume, this might be an indication that the concentration has gotten out of hand, at the expense of society itself. In other words, if you have a bank account with a balance of $15 billion, do you really need $5 billion more?  Will you ever use it? There is an opportunity cost—part of which being contributing back to society and reducing the economic inequality. Even so, this way of thinking reflects a value on solidarity that is much more European than American, at least in terms of being valued. In other words, the typical American would be more likely to object to any limitation on economic freedom, even if the playing field is tilted in the direction of the wealthy being able to take disproportionate advantage of that freedom, irrespective of whether the additional wealth is usable.  

Sources:

David Gauthier-Villars, “Wealthy French Push for Extra Tax,” Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2011. 

Matt Krantz and Barbara Hansen, “CEO Pay Sours While Workers’ Pay Stalls,” USA Today, April 4, 2011. 

Sarah Anderson, “Executive Pay Debate Raging in Europe and the United States,” Foreign Policy in Focus, August 28, 2007. 

Advertisers Remove Ads on YouTube: Fair to YouTube and Video-Producers?

One day after Thanksgiving in 2017, “a fresh wave of advertisers suspended commercials on Youtube after their ads showed up next to videos that appeared to attract pedophile viewers.”[1] Youtube had removed ads from roughly 3 million videos, but the company’s use of human and AI checkers simply could not keep pace with the number of uploaded videos. Even so, Diageo, maker of Smirnoff and Johnnie Walker (alcohol drinks), announced it would hold off its ads until “appropriate safeguards are in place.”[2] Mars and Adidas took a similar line. The question is whether those advertisers were being fair to Youtube and even the producers of the videos.

After a similar revolt the previous March, YouTube and hired more human reviewers and furnished advertisers with new tools to control where their ads would appear. Did not those companies have some responsibility to keep tabs on their ads, especially given the incentive to do so.  “Advertisers don’t want their brands associated with objectionable content and as well can face criticism if their advertising money goes to support the videos’ creators.”[3] It would not have been prudent to leave it to YouTube to review the ads, especially if the advertisers knew that YouTube was short-staffed. Unlike the advertisers, YouTube’s management had little incentive; the pull-out of certain advertisers in March, 2017 had “little impact” on Alphabet’s (Google’s) overall business. In fact record profits were posted.

Of course, the ability and will to review ads, whether by the advertisers or YouTube, would not in itself have caught the cases in which the videos themselves were salubrious and yet received unsavory comments from viewers. An advertiser could hardly be blamed for placing an ad in such a video; neither would YouTube be culpable in having permitted the video in the first place. So even if sordid comments could be readily removed, the incentives would be lacking. To be sure, YouTube is responsible for removing such comments, and just because blame would not be justified concerning innocent videos does not necessarily mean that such blame would not be exacted anyway.

The nuances of responsibility suggest that the reaction of the advertisers was rather blunt and even impulsive, and not entirely fair to YouTube and the video-producers. Distinguishing between objectionable and proper videos, and then between the latter and disgusting comments would be part of a smarter, more refined approach.

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[1] Stu Woo and Sam Schehner, “YouTube Deals With Another Advertiser Backlash,” The Wall Street Journal, November 25-26, 2017.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

On the Unfairness of the Bonus System on Wall Street

Craig A. Dubow, Gannett’s former chief executive, had a short six-year tenure that was, by most accounts according to The New York Times, “a disaster.” David Carr reports: “Gannett’s stock price declined to about $10 a share from a high of $75 the day after [Dubow] took over; the number of employees at Gannett plummeted to 32,000 from about 52,000, resulting in a remarkable diminution in journalistic boots on the ground at the 82 newspapers the company owns. . . .  the company strip-mined its newspapers in search of earnings, leaving many communities with far less original, serious reporting. . . . Not only did Mr. Dubow retire under his own power because of health reasons, he got a mash note from Marjorie Magner, a member of Gannett’s board, who said without irony that ‘Craig championed our consumers and their ever-changing needs for news and information.’ But the board gave him far more than undeserved plaudits. Mr. Dubow walked out the door with just under $37.1 million in retirement, health and disability benefits. That comes on top of a combined $16 million in salary and bonuses in the last two years.”

Besides the inherent unfairness in an incompetent manager getting millions of dollars in compensation (for championing incompetence?), it is morally problematic when, as Carr puts it, “the consequences of bad decisions land on everyone except those who made them.” As already pointed out above, in the midst of Dubow’s “championing” (this word is so broad it has scarce any real meaning), “the number of employees at Gannett plummeted to 32,000 from about 52,000.” One could just as easily point to Bank of America’s downsizing of its labor force in the wake of Ken Lewis’ shopping spree at Countrywide and Merrill Lynch. Lewis really did exemplify the “walmart” mentality applied to banking: an almost-complete indifference to quality in a desire to be everything to everyone. The “exporting” of bad consequences while exuberant rewards are retained indicates that the corporate executive compensation system in the United States is fundamentally broken. The fixation on aligning an executive’s incentives with the financial enrichment of the stockholders has not functioned as anticipated.

For one thing, the vesting of stock, which is meant to orient an executive to the longer term financial interest of the stockholders, is typically bypassed as an executive gets the equivalent in cash (or stock) from his or her new employer. An executive can thus discount having to look out for the eventual downside in his or her decisions.

Moreover, the sheer amount of the compensation cannot be justified on the basis of a competitive upper echelons labor market (which functions more like an oligarchy). Indeed, the degree of fixation on the bonus system alone has resulted in larger payouts (as executives make decisions primarily from the standpoint of the impact on their bonus). David Carr points to the excess as mentioned in a USA Today editorial: “The bonus system has gone beyond a means of rewarding talent and is now Wall Street’s primary business. Institutions take huge gambles because the short-term returns are a rationale for their rich payouts. But even when the consequences of their risky behavior come back to haunt them, they still pay huge bonuses.” Carr’s overall point is that this hypertrophy allies to corporate America—not just Wall Street, though certainly it is salient there too.

When John Thain of Merrill Lynch gave lip-service to serving the stockholders, even his own subordinates knew he was more concerned with having to play second fiddle to Ken Lewis at Bank of America than with keeping Merrill’s stockholders from losing everything (as Lehman Brothers’ stockholders did). Even as Fleming got $29 per share as a buyout price from Lewis, Thain preferred a line of credit of billions from Goldman Sachs in exchange for a 10% ownership that would keep Thain on top. That was Thain’s driving motivation: to remain CEO. Meanwhile, the general public assumed that CEOs, including Thain, were motivated to act in their stockholder interests—that boards of directors insisted on this agency. However, where a CEO is focused on his or her bonus (Thain insisted on $40 million cash bonus even as Merrill was losing billions) and position (and thus future bonuses) and the CEO controls “his or her” board, the stockholders are in actuality left unknowingly fluttering in the wind—relying on a system of executive compensation that supposedly aligns the executives’ motivation with the financial interests of the stockholders. Much too much is being assumed here, yet assumptions, like habits, are difficult to break.

Source:

 David Carr, “Why Not Occupy Newsrooms?” The New York Times, October 24, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/business/media/why-not-occupy-newsrooms.html

Problems in American Executive Compensation: The Ethical Dimension

According to The New York Post, 66% of the income growth in the United States between 2001 and 2007 went to the top 1% of all Americans. In 1950, the ratio of the average executive’s paycheck to the average worker’s paycheck was about 30 to 1. By the year 2000, that ratio had exploded to between 300 to 500 to one. Because American executives tend to be paid more in total compensation than do their European colleagues, the ratios are lower in in the E.U. Hence one might ask what is behind the trajectory in the United States. 

Does a shift from manufacturing to knowledge-based industries occasion a widening economic gulf? Even as late as 2010, the United States still had the largest manufacturing sector in the world. I suspect that the change is not so much tied to the number or even proportion of factory workers as it is to changes in executive compensation. Specifically, in the 1990s stock options took off as a part of such compensation because boards wanted to tie executives' compensation to long term firm performance. Even if the alignment of incentives was strengthened, a side effect was an explosion in the overall level of a given executive's compensation. In other words, if an executive's company did well, so too did his or her total compensation package. This byproduct in turn raised the ethical issue of fairness.  Specifically, is a CEO's work really worth tens of millions in a given year to a firm or to society at large?  Is a CEO's effort really so much more than that of a mid-level manager or an employee in operations?  

To obviate any ethical violations of fairness, which human beings seem able to detect innately, boards could reduce the overall compensation packages of executive managers even as the proportion in stock options is increased.  Lest it be argued that the market demands the higher amounts, it could be argued that that market is an oligarchy rather than being competitive. If so, there might be a legitimate role for the U.S. Government as an umpire establishing and protecting competitive markets. Otherwise, an oligarchy can become a self-perpetuating club that functions primarily in the interest of its members, which occasions the ethical objection of fairness.

Source:

"So Long, Middle Class," New York Post, August 1, 2010.

Justice as Fairness: Greece’s Bond-Holder Holdouts

In the wake of the agreement whereby private holders of Greek debt would swap the bonds and take a 75% loss, two or three percent of the private holders—namely, well-financed hedge funds including Aurelius Capital and Elliott Associates—were thought to be mulling over holding out for full pay-outs instead of agreeing to take the loss. Greece’s dilemma would have been to pay them in full in order to avoid a default and face the ire of the holders who took the losses, or risk default by invoking a collective bargaining law to force the holdouts to swap their bonds.

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Efficiency and Ethics: On the Fairness of High-Speed Trading

Two months into 2012, the SEC announced that it had been examining the trading activities of high-frequency trading firms.  According to the Wall Street Journal, the SEC was “examining, among other things, whether high-frequency firms benefit from delays in the dissemination of prices from various corners of the markets. . . . High-speed firms use direct feeds from exchanges that can give them a leg up on slower traders.” High-frequency traders “can access prices a split second faster through their access to direct feeds.” This is accomplished by placing the trading computers in the same data center that houses the exchange’s computer servers. Just over a year later, the Wall Street Journal reported that high-speed traders were using “a hidden facet” of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s computer system “to trade on the direction of the futures market before other investors get the same information.” Even getting the confirmation of a high-speed trade just one to ten milliseconds faster can enable a computer to know the direction a commodity is going and trade on it. According to the Wall Street Journal, the “ability to exploit such small time-gaps raises questions about transparency and fairness amid the computer-driven, rapid-fire trading that increasingly grips Wall Street and confounds regulators.” Both the increasing use of high-speed trading and the problem of accountability from a regulatory point of view raise the stakes in determining the ethics of the practice. 

Has the increasing role of high-speed trading rendered the individual investor a "second-class citizen" in the stock market?

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.  

Justice as Fairness: Writing Down Greek Debt

In 2012, 80% of Greece’s private creditors agreed to “voluntarily” convert their Greek debt into debt of a bit less than half the face-value (plus a lower interest rate). With such a proportion having agreed to the swap without triggering credit default swap insurance payouts, Greece could get the E.U. to agree to force the remaining 20% to involuntary write-downs. That would trigger the credit default swaps, at least in theory.

Because any write down of Greek debt by other E.U. states or the E.U.’s central bank (equivalent to the Federal Reserve) would be tantamount to additional aid to Greece, the E.U.’s basic law would again need to be amended (which must be unanimous). So the E.U. (and the international IMF) exempted themselves even as they pushed for “voluntary” write downs by private debt-holders. This hardly seems fair. Moreover, any pressure from the E.U. could have been sufficient for the credit default swaps to be triggered. To be truly voluntary, the write downs would have to have come from the private bondholders themselves rather than from governmental pressure. Even so, that 80% agreed, it is only fair that the remaining 20% be forced to capitulate. Otherwise, holding out could be a strategic competitive advantage financially. Refusing to compromise while other similar parties do is unfair whether between private creditors or governments.

In my view, Greece should have secured the E.U.’s approval on instituting the collective bargaining statute in order to get all of the state’s private holders of Greek bonds to take a write down. It would have triggered the credit default swap insurance claims, so the bondholders might actually have preferred being forced even if more of their Greek debt was written off. Furthermore, E.U. officials should have subjected the E.U. states to join the private bondholders. At the time of the 80% voluntary agreement in 2012, Greek debt in 2020 was forecasted to be at 120% of Greece’s total economic activity.[1] This is still quite high, particularly given the recessionary impact of the continued Greek austerity. Unfortunately, the (excessive) power of state officials at the E.U. level meant that a conflict of interest interfered with amending the E.U.’s basic law to permit the state governments and the ECB to take write downs.

In terms of ethical theory, one could apply John Rawls’ Theory of Justice here. In this theory, there is a veil of ignorance concerning where one will be in the system for which one is making rules. Not knowing whether one would represent a government or private bondholder, for example, one would not be likely to add the rule in which only the private bondholders write off their Greek bonds. Not knowing which E.U. state one would represent, one would not add a rule favoring Germany and France over Greece. Not knowing whether one is an official of the E.U. Commission or a member of a state legislature such as the Bundestag, one would not make a rule allowing the states to protect their interests at the expense of the E.U. Rawls adds that because of the veil, any rule would see to it that the position of the least well situated is improved. So it would not be the case that Germany could dictate to the E.U. or so successfully protect German interests at the expense of Greece. Indeed, the bias would be in seeing that the people least well off in the least well off state are not further downtrodden as a result of any proposed rule. This might be part of Rawls penchant for redistribution, however. At the very least, we could say that the rules enacted under justice as fairness would be in the interest of the system itself rather than any particular part thereof. In terms of the writing down of Greek debt, the E.U. could have been fairer in how it went about designing its rules. There was not exactly a veil of ignorance on the vested interests that were in a position to protect themselves at Greece’s expense.

1. Charles Forelle, Stelios Bouras, and Alkman Granitsas, “Greece Passes Key Debt Test,” The Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2012.

Is Corporate Social Responsibility the Same as Business Ethics?

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is typically thought to be a topic in the field of business ethics. If a company is socially responsible, it is typically presumed to be ethical in being socially responsible. Solidifying this attribution, some scholars of CSR have even sought to explicitly base it on specific ethical principles. However, contrasting a corporate policy with societal norms or specifying how corporations can get in line with them is not to provide an ethical justification.  Even if a societal norm is consistent with an ethical principle, the norm itself is something that is, rather than a justification for what ought to be. To attempt to derive ought from is is known as the naturalistic fallacy. It is like getting what ought to be from a melon ripening in a field. Is does not imply or justify ought.


This paragraph has been incorporated into the introduction in Cases of Unethical Business, which is available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.