A Professional Misnomer: Everyone Is a Self-Proclaimed Professional!

Certainly by the turn of (and well into) the twenty-first century, the term, "professional" had become such a cherished word in the American lexicon that every American had decided that he or she is one. Evincing the Lake Wobegon effect—the tendency of most people to describe themselves or their abilities as above average—nearly everyone is wont to say, “I am a professional.” On housing listings on Craigslist, for example, people routinely use the word to signify that they are not students. In fact, even some students characterize themselves as professionals (though not as professional students!). Such common usage belies the term's claim to having a specific meaning. Moreover, the tendency of non-professions to deem themselves as professions nonetheless may evince one of the downsides of democracy—namely, its proclivity to excess in terms of self-entitlement. This is particularly likely to ensue from a citizenry that is lacking in self-discipline, virtue and knowledge. 

I contend that the self-appellation of “professional” is in actuality an attempt at inclusion in what was hitherto known as “the professional class.” Nietzsche’s thesis is relevant regarding the instinct of certain herd animals to dominate as if they were strong—even though they are in fact weak. 

It is as though a manager at Walmart imagines a concept of egalitarianism wherein he is akin to a lawyer or surgeon—perhaps based on the fact that the manager distinguishes himself somehow from his subordinate “employees.”  Even in the midst of such self-vaunting, a knowledge of store policies and years of practice in dealing with customer complaints do not constitute an equivalent to the knowledge of law or medicine required of a lawyer and physician, respectively. Nor is there an obligation to the public such as in entailed in the practice of law or medicine.

Technically, the term "professional" applies to “the professions.”  This does not mean “any profession” in the sense of “any job category.” Because a professional relies on years of study, albeit undergraduate (meaning only one degree in a discipline/school of knowledge), in his or her practice, he or she must be allowed significant autonomy. Hence the partnership arrangement, wherein the self-discipline of peerage rather than a boss is relied on, is the typical business form for law firms, CPA firms, and medical offices. Managers in business are not professionals. This can be seen both from the standpoint of the relative salience of a responsibility to the client/customer and of judgment.

According to Relson (p. 750), “the basic social role of the physician . . . is to be an agent and trustee for the patient. Physicians are ethically bound to place the medical care needs of their patients before their own financial interests – an obligation that clearly sets the practice of medicine apart from business.” One could add a lawyer's ethical obligation to act in the interest of the client and the CPA's obligation to act in the interest of the public (people who rely on the financial statements). In business by contrast, "buyer beware" is often the default; a business practioner serves a customer for monetary gain.

Similarly, the judgment of a lawyer, physician or CPA is not easily second-guessed by people outside of the respective profession. Even in a hospital, a physician is not reviewed by a manager who is not also a physician. In contrast, non-managerial board directors commonly review the performance of managers.

Put another way, whereas one can manage a business without having attended business school, I do not think any of us would agree to be seen by a physician who had not graduated from a medical school. Nor would a defendant in a criminal case be likely to chance a conviction (and decades in prison) by hiring a lawyer who had not studied law. Creditors and investors would think twice about the unqualified opinion of a CPA firm whose auditors had not passed the CPA exam after years of study of accounting.  That a certified public accountant might also engage in consulting, however, does not mean that consultants are thereby also professionals. Even were consultants to devise a certifying exam, it would not be as substantive or relied on as the lawyer bar exam, medical boards, and the CPA exam.

According to John Boatright (2008), the "work of most financial services providers does not meet the standard criteria for a profession. Among the criteria for a profession which are lacking in financial services are a high degree of organization and self-regulation, a code of ethics, and a commitment to public service. These criteria are possibly met by financial planners and insurance underwriters, but not by brokers, bankers, traders . . ., who, in the strict sense of the term, are not professionals." Financial planners and insurance underwriters come up short, however, in terms of educational requirements. 

According to Boatright (1992), a professional’s stock in trade is a body of specialized knowledge that is the basis for making judgments. Not only is the reliance placed on a professional’s judgment relatively important; professionals are paid primarily for the value of their knowledge that is the basis for their judgments. Accordingly, it is difficult, if not impossible, anyone other than their peers to evaluate their practice.  In fact, Jean Van Houtte (p. 207) refers to professionals as “individuals who practice their occupation autonomously.” Even another surgeon is limited in being able to second-guess a colleague without being in the operating room at the time. The salient element of judgment includes discretion that is difficult for even colleagues to evaluate (though not impossible); obvious lapses, for example, can easily be discerned by a professional’s peers. 

In short, the term "professional" has a specific and limited meaning centered on the responsibility-autonomy that is entailed when specialized-knowledge-informed-judgment is salient in the practice of an occupation. The term does not apply to anyone who does something for a living (as opposed to being an avocation).  If it did, then even prostitutes and politicians would be professionals.  The term “professional politician” connotes ignorance, for which political office is not a job?  It is not like one can be governor of Alaska as a hobby. Also, neither "mature" nor "responsible” is interchangeable with “professional.” Nor does the term mean “acting impersonally or bureaucratically rather than emotionally.” It is no accident that people not in one of the professions use notably wide criteria.

Until the last few decades of the twentieth century, the term "professional" did not suffer from such lack of clarity. For example, Joe Flom, who was instrumental as a lawyer in the hostle take-over bubble that began in the 1970s, claimed that his parents wanted him to be a "professional." He wrote that for them, "being a professional was a great thing. . . . That meant either a doctor or a lawyer." This was the popular application: medicine or law--not a manager or sales person, or even a CEO. Then a sort of inflation set in, and the value associated with being a “professional” has diminished in proportion. The presumption that simply getting hired or being mature on the job makes a person a professional is odious and false. In fact, the over-reach itself evinces an underlying sordid character. Ironically, such a person is in need of more supervision, rather than warranting any sort of autonomy. 

Sources:

Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 2011).

John R. Boatright, “Conflict of Interest: An Agency Analysis.” Pp. 187-203 in Ethics and Agency Theory: An Introduction, Norman E. Bowie and R. Edward Freeman, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

John R. Boatright, Ethics in Finance (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

Arnold S. Relman, “Dealing with Conflicts of Interest,” New England Journal of Medicine 313 (1985): 749-51.

Jean Van Houtte, “Research Report: Conflicts of Interest in Law Firms in Belgium,” Legal Ethics 12 (part II): 207-28.

See also:

Skip Worden, On the Arrogance of False Entitlement: A Nietzschean Critique of Business Ethics and Management.

“No Loans” on Gun Sales: G.E. as Socially Responsible or Financially Savvy?

In the wake of the Sandy Hook school shooting in Newton, Connecticut in late 2012, General Electric announced that the company would no longer finance consumers’ gun purchases. Russell Wilkerson, a G.E. spokesman, wrote in an email that the new policy was being adopted “in light of industry changes, new legislation and tragic events that have caused widespread re-examination of policies on fire-arms.” In other words, the policy shift was not simply a reaction to Sandy Hook. Rather, the company’s executives were adapting to changes in the organization’s environment, including the industry itself. This opens up the question of whether the new policy can be classified under the rubric of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Perhaps the adaptation was simply good business, with the appearance of “CSR” adding some reputational capital through a good public-relations campaign.

Do business principles mandate treating this product like any other?  Source: NBC News

Well-meaning moralists in particular may have a tendency to project their own strident sense of obligation onto other people, and even organizations as if they too could be moral agents. Yet an organization, like a biological organism, must adapt to its changing environment, or risk being replaced by a competitor that has achieved a better fit to the new environment. Does such adaptation, which renders a company more fit by means of a sort of competitive natural-selection process, involve obligation manifested as responsibility to that environment, or is the adapting simply a matter of survival and even accruing surplus? To do one’s duty is not typically said of what a person wants to do anyway in line with self-interest. A person would quickly see through my claim that it is my duty to eat the remaining chocolate sundae so not to waste food. People do not typically fall over themselves to do something out of a feeling of duty or felt responsibility. For the sense of obligation or responsibility to be the primary motivator, the person (or persons, in the case of a company) must not otherwise be inclined, as from the anticipation of a benefit, to act. When stimulated, self-interest tends to eclipse the feeling of duty of responsibility. This thesis can be applied to GE’s policy on financing firearm purchases. 
First, though, can the policy be said to fall under the rubric of corporate social responsibility? What if marketing the policy was simply good business? The societal benefit in making it more difficult for people to buy guns may simply have been intended as a byproduct. Surely the societal good of a byproduct has worth even without having been motivated when the policy was chosen. Even so, the primacy of self-interest--the profit motive--irrationally taints the resulting societal good. Such a company's societal reputation would be enhanced by the good of the byproduct and decreased by the primary motivation of self-interest.  
How salient was the profit-motive in GE's decision to stop lending on gun sales, and how great was the impact in terms of the benefit to society, beyond the company? GE Capital Finance had already stopped providing consumer financing for new gun-shop customers in 2008. The policy change in 2013 merely extended the ban to existing customers. So it is not as though potentially new customers would be discouraged from buying a gun on impulse for nefarious purposes. The impact on the bottom line from lost sales could not have been assumed to be great; even if new and existing gun customers had been eligible for financing before the policy change in 2013, we would still be talking about a small fraction of GE’s revenue. Additionally, according to USA Today in 2013, GE’s “decision affects fewer than 75 retailers, which GE says is about 0.001% of all gun retailers.” This is because the policy “affects only retailers that sell firearms exclusively.” General merchandise stores, such as Walmart, were excluded from the company’s lending ban. 
However, Wells Fargo had stopped financing gun purchases in 2004 “for business reasons,” according to company spokeswoman Lisa Westermann. Perhaps it was good business at GE too, but not directly. 
Indeed, the "corporate social responsibility" policy as promotion could have been expected to boost sales companywide without much cost in foregone gun sales on credit to new customers in gun stores only. In fact, the policy as promoted could even be misleading, as in the article's title in USA Today, “GE Won’t Make Loans to Buy Guns” even though GE would still be financing guns—just not through stores that sell only guns. The gap itself between the publicized and actual policy could mean that the managers' intent had been to use “marketed CSR” to boost the company's reputational capital with as little cost as possible. In other words, the profit-motive was likely the motive. If most of GE’s lending on gun purchases was through multi-merchandise retail stores, GE could capitalize financially on sympathy from the school shooting without having to give up much financially. Interestingly, the shooter’s father, Peter Lanza, was a GE executive at the time—the company being based in Fairfield, Connecticut. Had other GE executives felt obligated, also being at such close range to the tragedy, to protect the kids, we would not have seen the sort of motivation that led to the exceptions and allowing the misleading storyline to go uncorrected. Were the primary intent that of protecting kids at schools from getting shot, the loopholes would not have been allowed to exist even if GE had to wait for contract renewals with general-purpose retailers such as Walmart.  
Often corporate social responsibility and business ethics are conflated. The distinction in this case is clear. The fitness of a policy to societal norms is a descriptive matter of whether organizational values are in sync with societal ones, whereas the misleading claim to have have ended loans on gun sales is a normative matter. Whether the norm in GE is consistent with the societal norm on the role of guns in the tragedies does not require justification by ethical reasoning and principles or theories. In contrast, whether a company should be misleading or even fail to stop it in the press necessarily includes resort to ethical principles, for only they can justify the claim that the motive or consequence is unethical. 
Still another lesson to take from this case involves the choice to wade into a controversial societal issue. As in the case of gun control, which is really about access to guns, entering a controversial debate puts a company at risk for being negatively viewed by the “other side.” This could significantly reduce the good  to the company obtained from the use of corporate social responsibility. 
A USA Today poll taken at the time of the policy change in 2013 found public support for new gun-control legislation “slipping below” 50 percent. GE risked many people agreeing with John Meek, the owner of a gun store in Illinois, who called GE’s policy “an injustice” because the instrument rather than the user is being blamed. Howard Schultz of Starbucks, in contrast, correctly judged the changing American attitude toward gay marriage in using the company to promote the cause, even if a CEO using a company for a personal political agenda is unethical. A dramatically changing shift in societal mores, norms, or attitudes is like a wave that managers strategizing corporate social responsibility programs and policies can ride, whether the motive is financial gain only or includes improving the social good. What might seem like an easy way to enhance a company's societal reputation can easily backfire if not done with attention to a changing business environment. 

Source:

Paul Davidson, “GE Won’t Make Loans to Buy Guns,” USA Today, April 25, 2013.

How Much Economic Distance Is Justified?

The median household income in the U.S. in 2016 was about $60,000. The following year, Citibank’s CEO, Mike Corbat, received a 48% increase in compensation--$23 million. Goldman Sachs’ Lloyd Blankfein enjoyed a 9% rise, to $24 million. JP Morgan Chase’s Jamie Dimon received $29.5 million.[1] The sheer distance between the median and bank CEOs’ incomes not only begs the question—were the executive compensations justified?—but also raises the question—is such distance itself justified?

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[1] “How Good Were the Paydays for Bank Chiefs . . . and Shareholders?: DealBook Briefing,” The New York Times, February 16, 2018.

God's Gold on Wall St.: A Vaunted Self-Assessment of God's Work

A year after the financial crisis of 2008, Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO of Goldman Sachs,  found himself vilified for his firm’s quick return to risky trading in spite of its new bank holding company status. Populist resentment at the time was especially pitted against the hefty bonuses from the trades. Also, people were upset about the benefits that the bank had obtained from the decisions of its alums in the U.S. Government—specifically, in the U.S. Department of the Treatury. For instance, Goldman Sachs and other AIG counterparties got a the dollar-for-dollar payout from AIG thanks to an infusion of funds for that specific purpose by Treasury. Regardless, in an interview with the London Times, the highest-paid CEO (at least in the financial sector) dismissed such talk and defended his money-making machine and its compensation.  In addition to being the engine of economic recovery, according to Blankfein, Goldman Sachs provides a social function in making capital available to companies so they can expand. Stunningly, he adds, “I’m doing God’s work.”[1]  Such a claim is a far cry indeed from Thomas Jefferson’s warning that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies.[2]  Perhaps God intends to undo our liberties by bailing out the banks.

Besides these rather obvious problems with Blankfein's religious claim is his presumption to know what God's work is, and, furthermore, that he is doing it.   Even though a feckless system of corporate governance can enable a CEO to essentially function as his or her own boss, including doing the board's job of evaluating his or her own performance, it is a tall order for a human being to be able to evaluate his performance as God's work.   To be sure, it is possible that God is an intelligent being that bestows favor on his golden stewards for doing His work.

Lloyd Blankfein may have been involved in two conflicts of interest: 1) that of having excessive power over the board whose principal task it is to oversee him, 2) having communicated with GS alums in high posts in the U.S. Government (e.g., Hank Paulson) and perhaps having them enact policies on GS's behalf.   It may be that institutional and personal conflicts of interests can become so ubiquitous that they are simply not seen by the culprits. Furthermore, it could be that the denial enabled by a tacit presumptuousness is like a white movie screen on which even doing God's work can be projected. How ironic it is, that sordid proprietary interest could operate not merely under the subterfuge of being a neutral "market-maker," but also as God's work. Such work is two degrees of freedom away from squalid greed. So it is remarkable that the two could become conflated in a mind.

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[1] John Arlidge, I’m doing ‘God’s work. Meet Mr. Goldman Sachs, The Sunday Times, 11/9/09.

[2] Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, Monticello, May 28, 1816, in Paul L. Ford, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1892-99),  XI, 533.

See related book: God's Gold and Essays on the Financial Crisis

Executive Compensation (Part I): Systemic Risk

In the wake of the financial crisis, according to the Huffington Post, “a number of the nation's largest banks were excused from the government's rescue program before they had returned to a position of complete financial security -- in part because they wanted to avoid restrictions on how much their executives would get paid, according to a new report from the program's government overseer. Citigroup, Wells Fargo, PNC and Bank of America successfully lobbied to leave the federal bailout program early in 2009, even though the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had recommended they take additional steps to shore up their assets, according to a new report from the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Relief Asset Program, a government watchdog office. Regulators, including the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, eventually ‘relaxed’ their criteria for letting the banks out of the program, the report says, leaving questions about whether the banks had strengthened their holdings enough to be able to withstand another systemic crisis.”[1]

The Huffington Post reports that according to SIGTARP, in 2009, the “four banks repeatedly tried to leave the bailout program, also known as TARP, ahead of schedule, claiming that the stigma attached to the bailout would damage investor confidence in their stability. Bank of America was especially persistent, submitting 11 separate exit proposals to the Federal Reserve Board in less than a month. The banks, particularly Citigroup and Bank of America, also expressed concern that if they stayed in TARP, they would be subject to the program's restrictions on executive compensation.

"Ultimately, the federal banking regulators ended up bowing to pressure" to let the banks leave early, said Christy Romero, Acting Special Inspector General for TARP and the author of the report. Romero added that in the event of another shock, many banks could be left with too little capital to endure, raising the possibility that "it could potentially trigger an avalanche of severe consequences to the broader economy." As a result of the regulators’ lenience, Romero told The Huffington Post, the financial system is still carrying considerable systemic risk from huge, interconnected banks, well after the meltdown of 2008. "The institutions that were 'too big to fail' ... are bigger than they were before," said Romero. "It's very critical that regulators remain vigilant to banks' demands to relax capital requirements."[2]

In short, the U.S. Government and its central bank, the Federal Reserve, acquiesced on bank executive’s desire for more (i.e., greed) at the expense of reducing systemic risk. That the bankers presumed themselves as being in a position to lobby—especially to obviate compensation restrictions —given the roles played by the banks in the mortgage securities crisis, is astounding, as is the obsequious reaction of the regulators. The dynamic itself evinces the U.S. as a plutocracy rather than as representative democracies. Furthermore, the motive of the bankers demonstrates a continued fixation on gain at the expense not only of the system (i.e., systemic risk), but also of stockholders. 

See Essays on the Financial Crisis.

1. Alexander Eichler, “BofA, Wells Fargo, Citigroup Left TARP Early to Avoid Restrictions on Executive Pay,” The Huffington Post, September 30, 2011.

2, Ibid.

Societal Norms Understating Unethical Corporate Cultures: The Case of Wells Fargo

The case of Wells Fargo suggests that even when a massive scandal is revealed to the general public, the moral depravity of a company’s culture is skirted rather than fully perceived. Wells Fargo was fined a total of $185 million by regulatory agencies including the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which had accused the bank of creating as many as 1.5 million deposit accounts and 565,000 credit-card accounts that for which consumers never asked. The bank fired 5,300 employees over the course of about five years after it was revealed those employees had opened the accounts and credit cards. Wells Fargo's CEO at the time, John Stumpf, "opted" for a cushy early retirement after an abysmal performance before a U.S. Senate committee; he walked away from the bank with around $130 million, and none of the other members of senior management were fired, or "retired," obliterating any hope societally that any of the senior managers would be held accountable. This result is particularly troubling, given the true extent to which that management had turned the bank into an ethically compromised organization.

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.  

Wall Street Banks in Commodities Businesses: An Inherently Unethical Conflict of Interest

Writing to the bank’s board of directors, an executive at Goldman Sachs wrote that the bank’s commodities division would achieve higher value “if the business was able to grow physical activities, unconstrained by regulation and integrated with the financial activities.”[1] According to Sen. Carl Levin, Goldman’s goal here is “to profit in its financial activities using the information it gains in the physical commodities business.”[2] The integration could be achieved in part by using the bank’s access to nonpublic information from the banking or trading operations to manipulate the price of a commodity by artificially restricting or adding to supplies through ownership at the production or storage stages. This structure contains a conflict of interest. Because resisting the temptation to exploit the conflict would put the Goldman bankers at odds with the bank’s financial interest, I contend that reliance by the public on intra-bank firewalls (i.e., policies) separating the commodity businesses from the bank’s trading operations is too weak to protect the public, including buyers of the commodity.






The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

A Conflict-of-Interest in Lobbying: The Case of JPMorgan

At the JP Morgan stockholder meeting on May 15, 2012, as the FBI was opening an investigation into the bank’s $2 (or $3 )billion loss on credit derivatives, Chair/CEO Jamie Dimon gave what the Huffington Post calls “a spirited defense of the bank’s efforts to lobby against stiffer financial regulation.” He argued that the bank’s interest is the same as the stockholders—namely, to make the financial system strong and sound. What he omitted was the part about the bank’s interest including its own profit, even if systemic risk of the system is increased as a result. In general, any business looks primary after its own interests, and only then to the general interests of the system.

The full essay is at "JPMorgan: An Unethical Monstrosity," available at Amazon. 

Credit-Card Companies in a Conflict of Interest

On April 12, 2012, Hawaii sued Bank of America, Chase, Citi, Barclays, Capital One, Discover, HSBC, and their subsidiaries, “claiming that the banks ‘slammed’ Hawaii credit card customers, charging them for products customers didn't need and that the companies never provided.”[1] The Hawaiian government alleges that the banks used “‘predatory tactics to sign up customers for services they either don’t want or don't qualify for,’ and the companies charged their customers ‘without their knowledge or consent,’ according to a press release issued by the Hawaii attorney general's office.”[2] According to the Attorney General, David Louie, “You don't know that you're enrolling, but they say, 'Oh you just enrolled,' okay, and now they've put a charge on your credit card.”[3]  The banks’ telemarketing departments may have charged customers an average of $150 in the form of small charges.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Bonnie Kavoussi, “Hawaii Sues Bank of America, Chase, Citi, Others For DeceptiveCredit Card Marketing,” The Huffington Post, April 13, 2012.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

Fraudulent Foreclosures

Looking at foreclosures from 2008 to 2010 of federally-backed mortgages serviced by five major banks, federal investigators at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) found that bank managers “ignored widespread errors in the foreclosure process, in some cases instructing employees to adopt make-believe titles and speed documents through the system despite internal objections.” Generally, the banks engaged “in a pattern of unfair and deceptive practices.”[1] This finding contradicts the self-serving statements by managers at the banks that blamed low-level employees. The investigation found that the managers had actually been the active agents. That is, the shortcuts were in many cases formulated and directed by managers. The inspector general at HUD pointed to “simple greed” to explain how so many people could have participated in the misconduct.[2] Considering that millions of Americans were tossed out of their homes as a result, I would sociopathic indifference or even callousness to the mix. Additionally, the rush to sign documents may have undercut the banks’ own positions with respect to both the foreclosure process and the homeowners—adding incompetence to the mix.

                  Four million foreclosures in the US during the 2007-2011 period.      Spencer Platt/Getty

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.  

1. Nelson Schwartz and J.B. Silver-Greenberg, “Bank Officials Cited in Churn of Foreclosures,” The New York Times, March 13, 2012.

2. Ibid.

Moral Hazard in Mortgages

“The cherished American ideal of self-reliance has a flip side”[1]  Before getting to the implications, or flip side, I want to fill out what informs this ideal. One could add to it the ideological stance that came into its own in 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan, who declared that government is the problem. This implies that government should be minimized, and otherwise corrected as much as possible. Government is hardly to be viewed as the solution. This is the legacy of the Kennedy assassinations of the 1960s, the Vietnam War, and Watergate as well as Ford’s pathetic “WIN” buttons and Carter’s micromanagement and failure in regard to the hostages in Iran. I was not old enough for the Kennedys’ truncated optimism (and that of Martin Luther King) to resonate; I knew the political (and economic) pessimism of the 1970s and the energizing “fix it” mentality of the early 1980s. Of course, Reagan’s “new federalism” failed, as did his aim to balance the federal budget, and the jury is still out on whether “peace through strength” pushed the USSR off the cliff.

Reagan is perhaps best known to historians and political theorists for having formally shifted the political paradigm’s default to “government is the problem” after at least a decade of political and economic paralysis. Dovetailing with the American ideal of self-reliance, the default on government was still a headwind for Barak Obama as he found he had to capitulate even on a “public option” for health insurance—relying instead on the same private insurers who had been excluding pre-existing conditions and otherwise cancelling policies at the advent of a new illness. In other words, that the health-insurance lobby could still call the shots at the White House suggests the continuance of the headwind running against government. Relatedly, in the 1990s Bill Clinton had to give up on his vision of using government for grand purposes because the American people were “not there.” Clinton found in the presidency instead a plethora of smaller accomplishments, such as adding to local police forces and otherwise acting as the mayor of an empire as if it took a village. He had figured out how to avoid the headwinds.

With this background in mind, we can now get to the matter of the implications of self-reliance and “government is the problem” as regards moral hazard. In economic terms, it refers to “the undue risks that people are apt to take if they don’t have to bear the consequences. In other words, if the money is free, why not spend it on a designer purse?”[2] Because of moral hazard, backed up by the ideal of self-reliance and the default of “government is the problem,” there is significant discomfort with the idea of bailouts and safety nets in American society. The notion that even a small portion of aid even to homeowners who are “under water” (i.e., they own more on their mortgages than their houses are now worth in terms of equity on the market) might find its way to the undeserving (or cheats) “can be enough to scuttle support, or restrict help so drastically that few can use it.” Adding to this sentiment, typically by vested interests, is the sanctity of contract dogma. This means that a mortgage borrower is obligated to pay whatever he or she had agreed to pay regardless of changed circumstances either of the borrower or the housing market.

Bankers “say that generously easing loan terms or reducing mortgages outright would only encourage homeowners who can pay to pretend they can’t. It would also, the bankers say, send a dangerous message: a financial commitment isn’t really a commitment.”[3] Additionally, homeowners “who keep paying their mortgages, even if their homes have lost value, reasonably wonder why neighbors who weren’t as responsible are getting help.”[4] Behind both of these concerns is resentment that someone else might get something too easily (i.e., beyond that which is deserved and what one can get oneself). It is not a very laudable mentality, psychologically and ethically. In other words, it is rather small. Even worse, bankers who themselves received bonuses paid for in part from bailouts were keeping borrowers from also being bailed out. It is as if the financial crisis of 2008 hit only one side of the ledger.

Shaun Donovan, the secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, said that although there is was a “nugget of truth” to the moral hazard argument, “only about 10 or 15 percent of Americans who can still pay their mortgages try to walk away from their debt. Most troubled homeowners, like the Katrina victims, are genuinely hard up.”[5] Accordingly, the bank bailout should have been oriented to them. Had it been, the banks’ balance sheets would not have been toxic and “two birds” would have been “killed” with “one stone.”

The “specter of moral hazard haunts a basic tension in American life: to what extent are people responsible for their own problems? The more trouble you’re in, moral hazard suggests, the less we should help.”[6] This relationship is the inverse of what it should be. That is, moral hazard should not apply as if survival itself were conditional. I am perhaps as innately American as they come, being born and raised in the Midwest, or “heartland of America.” Even so, when I hear politicians or others refer to others’ survival as somehow conditional (typically as based on a work history), I sense that the ideological belief is distinctly American. I revolt at the sheer self-centeredness of the people expressing the view and I reject the validity of the claim itself. For a society in which survival is deemed to be inherently conditional (as defined by people whose survival is not an issue) is no society at all. Put another way, if we all knew in the back of our heads that were we to fall on hard times and not be able to provide for our own shelter and food without taking them from others (i.e., remaining in society), life for all of us would be a little lighter and less existentially anxious. This is not to say that everyone has a right to a t-bone steak once a week or a mansion. The moral hazard argument conflates these with sustenance needs.

If a person is seriously under water, the sheer depth naturally dwarfs any consideration of culpability. If someone is barely breathing or starving, a natural sentiment of sympathy orients others to the question of how the plight may be quickly assuaged. I submit that the bailed out banker actively resisting any assistance for homeowners near foreclosure has a rather unnatural “hardness of heart,” or hardness more generally. To make aid conditional where basic necessities like shelter, food and medical care hang in the balance is to apply moral hazard beyond its ken. This overreach operates at the expense of human rights.

Essentially, applying moral hazard conditionality where survival itself is at issue for others is to presume a godlike position for oneself. In other words, the propensity to judge others’ extent of deservingness is premised on self-idolatrous pride. Given the nature of self-idolatry, it is no surprise that bankers who have benefited themselves (as well as their banks) would apply moral hazard to their counterparties but not to themselves. The conditionality does not apply to those bankers, whose lobby—which Sen. Durbin said owns Congress—makes sure of it. The resulting asymmetry can be interpreted as a reflection of the bias in the “self-reliance” and “government is the problem” default—a game-board that is tilted toward the rich because they can afford to be self-reliant and scoff at government as part of any solution to societal ills.

Ideally, a social contract, and thus a society, should be in balance, with basic human rights being beyond the reach of the inevitable swings in the political-ideological pendulum (i.e., the headwinds). Where the latter are definitive (and exclusive), sustenance needs, being an inherent human right, become valid outside of societal limits. In other words, where moral hazard is applied to basic shelter and food needs, people needing them have the inalienable human right to take them without regard to societal rules bearing on them. Even in political theory, possession of property is salient. Thomas Hobbes refers to the right of self-preservation as going beyond any law. Is extending moral hazard to cover necessities worth making society (and its laws) conditional?

1. Shaila Dewan, “Moral Hazard: A Tempest-Tossed Idea,” The New York Times, February 26, 2012. 
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Sanctity of Contract Breached on Mortgages

An audit in 2012 by San Francisco county officials of about 400 foreclosures “determined that almost all involved either legal violations or suspicious documentation. . . .  The improprieties range from the basic — a failure to warn borrowers that they were in default on their loans as required by law — to the arcane. For example, transfers of many loans in the foreclosure files were made by entities that had no right to assign them and institutions took back properties in auctions even though they had not proved ownership. . . . About 84 percent of the files contained what appear to be clear violations of law, it said, and fully two-thirds had at least four violations or irregularities.”[1] The problem seems to be systemic, suggesting that judges should be able to modify mortgages on the basis of nullified contract.

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.  

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1. Gretchen Morgenson, “Audit Uncovers Extensive Flaws in Foreclosures,” The New York Times, February 16, 2012.

Conflicts of Interest at the Federal Reserve

In 2011, “(m)ore than a dozen members of the regional Federal Reserve boards have had ties to banks or companies that received emergency funds during the [2008 financial] crisis, according to [a GAO report]. The report highlights a close relationship between the Fed's regional banks and many of the institutions they were lending to, adding credence to concerns that the financial sector enjoyed a largely consequence-free rescue in the wake of the crisis, thanks to its connections with the federal government.”[1] Meanwhile, mortgage borrowers with houses “under water” got hammered. From the crisis to the release of the GAO report in October 2011, there were millions foreclosures in the United States, with very little in the way of mortgage modifications or refinancing for those homeowners who needed relief. In other words, the bankers had connections in the banking regulatory agency while Congress left the troubled homeowners—constituents—at the mercy of the bankers. Their agency having their backs, the bankers could afford to take a hard line on the mortgages. The playing field, in other words, is not at all level. 


Material from this essay has been incorporated into "The Federal Reserve" in  Institutional Conflicts of Interest, which is available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.  

1. Alexander Eichler, “Conflicts of Interest Abound at the Federal Reserve, Report Finds,” The Huffington Post, October 19, 2011.

Jamie Dimon of JPMorganChase Exploits an Institutional Conflict of Interest

U.S. Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner, said on July 18, 2011 that he was not concerned about dire warnings from Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, a bank that was too big to fail and thus evinced systemic risk. Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, said the government regulations may have been suffocating the economic recovery. While it was nice of Jamie Dimon to be so civic-minded as to want to protect the recovery, his real objective was likely to increase his bank’s profitability through relaxed financial regulations in the U.S. If so, his ulterior motive was not in line with the economy overall, much less with society and the common good.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Banks on Reserve Requirements: An Institutional Conflict of Interest

As regulators were getting close to an international agreement on how much additional capital large banks that are deemed too big to fail should hold. In 2010, international policy makers met in Basil and agreed to 7 percent. The Dodd-Frank law passed in that same year in the U.S. meant that the Federal Reserve Bank would have to “impose tougher capital standards on ‘systemically important financial institutions’.”[1]  Hence, American officials wanted “to coordinate with global regulators so that U.S. firms aren’t put at a disadvantage.”[2] Not wanting to divert more capital to protect themselves from losses, banks were busy lobbying the regulators to reject the proposed 2.0 to 2.5 percentage points above the 7 percent set at Basil.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Deborah Solomon and Victoria McGrane, “Lenders Dig in on Rules,” The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2011.

2. Ibid.

Long Term Capital Management: An Institutional Conflict of Interest

By 1997, “after three years of strong profits for LTCM, the opportunities were drying up. There was too much money chasing the same investments. . . . In early 1998, LTMC decided to give a large portion of its capital back to its original investors because profitable opportunities were so hard to find. At the end of 1997, LTCM had nearly $7.5 billion under management, compared to $1 billion when it started, and it now returned $2.7 billion of that to investors. The partners also figured that they could, if necessary, simply leverage their portfolio further to compensate for the loss of capital, which would compound their personal gains. Greed was at the heart of what turned out to be a disastrous decision. . . . Unable to reproduce the returns of the first three years, LTCM took increasingly more risk, abandoning its purer arbitrage for the kinds of ‘directional’ investments Soros made and LTCM had so long disdained—such as trying to forecast interest rate and currency movements. More and more of these trades were unhedged.”[1] Furthermore, “LTCM’s risk models—VAR and related statistical tools . . . –were misleading.”[2] For example, diversification was little protection if there was a run on the banks. When Russia defaulted on August 17, 1997, LTCM’s hedges against its Russian investments were worthless. Furthermore, because all fixed income assets fell sharply in value, “diversification, it turned out, did not matter. The finely calculated relationships on which LTCM was built and which the firm always believed would hold started to come apart. VAR could  not account for such an unlikely but sweeping event—an event in which everyone wanted out at the same time and almost all investments fell significantly in price. The use of VAR itself precipitated much of the selling. Commercial banks under the jurisdiction of the Basel Agreements, which . . . set capital requirements based on the level of VAR (the lower the VAR, the lower the capital required), were forced to sell assets to raise capital.”[3] LTCM lost $1.9 billion that August. Eventually, fourteen banks, organized by the Fed, put together loans of more than $3.5 billion to purchase 90 percent of the firm.” LTCM “did manage to sell down assets in an orderly fashion and by early 2000 it was essentially out of business”[4] 


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 2011), 277-81.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

Wall Street Banks: Price-Making and Law-Breaking?

The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found in 2011 that “two Goldman employees, Deeb Salem and David Swenson, tried to manipulate prices of securities used to bet against mortgages. Both tried to help Goldman pile on larger bets against the mortgage market, and they wanted to be able to buy such negative bets more cheaply, the report said. Goldman, as a broker, was able to affect prices in the market through the bids and offers it gave out. Mr. Swenson wrote in May 2007 that the bank should try to ‘start killing’ prices on certain positions so that Goldman would be able to ‘pick some high quality stuff,’ according to the Senate report. The strategy, Mr. Swenson wrote, would ‘have people totally demoralized.’ The pair were unsuccessful in their attempt, and both denied making it to the Senate committee. Mr. van Praag said last week that the report had no evidence of manipulation. Still, the Senate report said that ‘trading with the intent to manipulate market prices, even if unsuccessful, is a violation of the federal securities laws.’”[1] I submit that it was also unethical. 


The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available at Amazon.com.

1. Louise Story and Gretchen Morgenson, “S.E.C. Case Stands Out Because It Stands Alone,” The New York Times, May 31, 2011.

Rating Moody’s and S & P: A Structural Conflict of Interest

For years, banks and other issuers have paid rating agencies to rate their securities. This is a bit like restaurants paying food critics to write on their food.  In the wake of the SEC’s charge that  people at Goldman Sachs built the Abacus investment to fall apart so a hedge fund manager, John A. Paulson, could bet against it, the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations questioned representatives from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s about how they rate risky securities. Carl M. Levin, the Michigan Democrat who heads the Senate panel, said in a statement: “A conveyor belt of high-risk securities, backed by toxic mortgages, got AAA ratings that turned out not to be worth the paper they were printed on.” Throughout the testimony, the institutional conflict of interest was salient whereby credit-rating agencies put market-share considerations foremost in rating securities presented by the banks that are paying the agencies.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon. 

Goldman's Ethical Conflict of Interest: Obviated or Enabled?

According to U.S. Senator Carl Levin, Goldman Sachs “profited by taking advantage of its clients’ reasonable expection[s] that it would not sell products that it did not want to succeed and that there was no conflict of economic interest between the firm and the customers that it had pledged to serve.”[1] Not only was the bank secretly betting against housing-related securities while selling them to clients, in at least one case a client shorting such a security was allowed to have a hand in picking the bonds. What is perhaps most striking, however, is how little Goldman Sachs has had to pay for acting at the expense of some of its clients. One might predict on this basis that the unethical culture at the bank is ongoing.


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

1. William D. Cohan, Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World (NY: Doubleday, 2011), p. 19.